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ABSTRACT
Coram Deo et Coram Mundo: The Two Kinds of Righteousness as a Normative
Framework for the Description, Interpretation, and Healing of Shame
by
Barson Lahivelo Mahafaly
Contemporary pastoral theologians, though describing and interpreting shame
from an interdisciplinary perspective, drawing both from theology and psychology, tend
to propose healing for shame only from a theological perspective. Transposing Martin
Luther’s doctrine of the two kinds of righteousness into an interdisciplinary framework,
this work proposes that pastoral theologians need to describe and interpret shame as well
as suggest strategies for its healing from both theological and social-scientific
perspectives.
Luther distinguishes between two kinds of righteousness, one passive and the
other active. Passive righteousness is the righteousness of Christ bequeathed to us
through the Word and the Sacraments (baptism and Holy Communion), which we receive
through faith alone, a total trust in God and God’s promise. This righteousness justifies us
before God (coram Deo) and is salvific. Active righteousness, on the other hand, is what
we do to serve and to care for the well-being of the self and the neighbor. It justifies us
before the world (coram mundo), but is not salvific.
The two kinds of righteousness can be associated with theology and sciences.
Also, the conditions of the relationship between the two kinds of righteousness can
determine the conditions of the relationship between theology and sciences. The two
kinds of righteousness are inseparable, distinct, and asymmetrical in order, with passive
righteousness having primacy over active righteousness. Theology and sciences are also
ii

inseparable, distinct, and asymmetrical in order, with theology having logical priority
over sciences.
The two kinds of righteousness as an interdisciplinary framework therefore
recommend that pastoral theologians approach pastoral issues such as shame from the
perspectives of both theology and sciences. Indeed, the two kinds of righteousness as an
interdisciplinary framework recommend that pastoral theologians address shame from
both theological and scientific perspectives, not only at the descriptive and interpretive
levels, but also at the pragmatic level.
Hence, while chapters two and three of this work develop Luther’s doctrine of the
two kinds of righteousness as an interdisciplinary framework, chapter four interprets
shame from both psychological and theological perspectives, chapter five describes the
personal, social, and theological dynamics of shame among Malagasy, and chapters six
and seven suggest strategies for the healing of shame from social-scientific and
theological perspectives, respectively.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This work came out of personal experiences with shame, the divine act of
justification, the process of communication known as Nonviolent Communication
(NVC), developed by Marshall Rosenberg,1 and Martin Luther’s theology. When I
entered the Ph.D. program at Luther Seminary in 2011, I had no specific topic of interest
for my dissertation. I came only with the general idea that I would explore something that
resonates with me personally. I had known before I came to the program that I have a
temper. Thus, in my first year (September 2011-August 2012), in addition to the reading
assignments for the classes I was taking, I read books on anger. All the books I read on
anger, however, did not resonate with my experience with it.
As a result, I stopped reading on anger in my second year (September 2012August 2013), and read instead on grief. I thought that my anger might have something to
do with grief. My older brother died at the age of two and half, when my mom was
pregnant with me, and I speculated that my mother’s grief over the death of my brother
might have been transferred to me. Later, my younger sister died when she was only six
months old. I was six years old at the time. So I remember her death and I remember I
felt sad for the loss. Again, books on grief did not resonate with what I longed for.

1
Cf. Marshall B. Rosenberg, Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Life, 2nd ed. (Encinitas,
CA: PuddleDancer Press, 2003).

1

2
Then, on Sunday afternoon, September 8, 2013, I randomly picked up Lewis
Smedes’ book Shame and Grace: Healing the Shame We Don’t Deserve,2 and read
through it. When I was reading through part one, “The Heaviness of Shame,” I kept
nodding my head and saying to myself: “Aha! This is it! It is shame! I have a shameprone personality! Now I know!” When I finished reading this part of the book, I went to
my wife and told her “Now I have a name for what has bothered me for so long! It is
shame!” My interest in shame started that Sunday, three years ago.
Shame is the painful feeling or experience that one is unworthy and therefore
unacceptable. Through different factors, this experience can, at any time in the lifespan,
become part of one’s personality. I do not know when shame began to be part of my
personality, but I remember I started feeling uncomfortable with myself at about the age
of ten. I have a vivid memory of the following experience: One day, I was walking to
school. I was in sixth grade. A good friend of my dad, who happened to be on the way to
my school, saw me and accompanied me. He talked to me along the way about the
importance of education and gave me some advice on what to do if I want to succeed at
school. He was friendly. But as I listened to him, a strange emotion rose up in my body. I
felt that I did not deserve his wise advice and kindness. I said to myself: “I am just a kid,
so why is he so kind and nice to me? He should not spend his time talking to me! I don’t
deserve it!”
Shame had controlled my life at different levels (such as personal, interpersonal,
familial, social, educational, marital, parental, pastoral, and spiritual, just to mention a

2
Lewis B. Smedes, Shame and Grace: Healing the Shame We Don’t Deserve (New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 1993).
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few) until September 8, 2013, when I could name it and become aware of its presence in
my life. Daniel Siegel, a pioneer in the field of interpersonal neurobiology (IPNB),3
asserts that “the shame-based conviction that we are defective, which often goes
underground, beneath our cortical consciousness, can sabotage us if it remains
unconscious.”4 But then he notes, “In our shame . . . if we own the truth of what has
happened, not only can we begin to repair the damage—which can be quite toxic to
ourselves as well as to others—we can also actually decrease the intensity of such events
and the frequency with which they occur.”5
Indeed, scholars of shame agree that becoming aware of and acknowledging one’s
shame weakens its power. Stephen Pattison states, “It is commonly agreed that shame
must be acknowledged and owned if it is to be healed. Without insight and knowledge
into the nature of shame a person will be unable to get rid of, or dissipate it.”6 Brené
Brown writes, “If we’re going to build shame resilience, we have to start by recognizing
and identifying shame.”7

Siegel defines IPNB as follows: “IPNB is not a branch of neuroscience, but a broad field drawing
on the findings from a wide range of disciplines that explore the nature of what it means to be human.
Based on science, IPNB seeks to create an understanding of the interconnections among the brain, the
mind, and our interpersonal relationships.” Daniel J. Siegel, The Developing Mind: How Relationships and
the Brain Interact to Shape Who We Are, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2012), 3.
3

4

Ibid., 196.

5

Daniel J. Siegel, Mindsight: The New Science of Personal Transformation (New York: Bantam
Books, 2010), 25.
6

Stephen Pattison, Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), 166.
7
Brené Brown, I Thought It Was Just Me (but It Isn’t): Making the Journey from “What Will
People Think?” to “I Am Enough” (New York: Gotham Books, 2007), 69.
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Moreover, as Jill L. McNish claims, shame, when owned, “holds many gifts for
the development of authentic spirituality.”8 My awareness of my shame has made me
realize the authenticity of God’s gift of justification. I grew up Lutheran and I became
acquainted with the doctrine of justification early in my life. But I could not make sense
of this invaluable doctrine until after I had become aware of my shame and
acknowledged it. Now in my deep experience of unworthiness and unacceptableness, i.e.,
shame, I go back again and again to God’s unconditional love and acceptance of me,
“[f]or I am convinced that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor rulers, nor things
present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor anything else in all
creation, will be able to separate [me] from the love of God in Christ Jesus [my] Lord”
(Romans 8:38-39).9 Justification is God’s unconditional “yes” to me. It is God’s
unconditional love and acceptance of me. I am worthy of being God’s child because of
what God has done for me in Jesus Christ, not because of what I do.
It is important to note here that because shame has led me to experience the
authenticity of justification, I have become interested in drawing connections between
shame and the law within the Lutheran law-and-Gospel framework.10 In the Lutheran
tradition, one function of the law is to reveal our sins and to prepare us to receive the
Gospel. My awareness of my shame has prepared me to receive and to genuinely
experience the gospel of justification.
8

Jill L. McNish, Transforming Shame: A Pastoral Response (New York: The Haworth Press,

2004), 43.
9

Scripture quotations, unless otherwise indicated, are from the New Revised Standard Version of

the Bible.
See the section “A Theological Interpretation of Shame” in chapter four for my first attempt to
draw connections between shame and the law.
10

5
My awareness of my shame, furthermore, has convinced me to welcome the
practice of NVC. I was introduced to NVC during the second semester of my first year in
the Ph.D. program. Though subsequently, I attended an NVC workshop in the summer of
2012, followed by an online NVC training during the fall of the same year, and another
NVC workshop in the summer of 2013, I was reluctant to practice NVC. I came to
embrace the practice of NVC only after I had acknowledged my shame.
Embracing justification and the practice of NVC at the same time, however,
presented a theological struggle to me, mainly at the theoretical level. I normally practice
NVC when I am overwhelmed by an experience of shame, and it works. NVC dissipates
the grip of shame. Yet I used to be uncomfortable with the practice of NVC because I
pictured it as works-righteousness. In other words, I struggled theologically with the use
of NVC.
Fortunately, given my interest in the doctrine of justification, I have been reading
Luther’s theology. My interest in Luther’s theology led me to his doctrine of the two
kinds of righteousness.11 And this doctrine solved my theological struggle with the use of
NVC. Now I know that the practice of NVC belongs to what Luther calls “active
righteousness,” whereas justification belongs to what he calls “passive righteousness.”
NVC becomes works-righteousness when it is used to justify oneself before God (Coram
Deo), for only God’s justification can justify a person before God. Active righteousness,
such as the practice of NVC, aims to serve the well-being of the self and the neighbor.

11

I discuss Luther’s doctrine of the two kinds of righteousness in chapter two.

6
Besides, the two kinds of righteousness, according to Luther, are distinct, yet
inseparable.12 This means, for me, that the doctrine of the two kinds of righteousness
suggests that human phenomena such as shame can and need to be addressed from the
perspective of passive righteousness and active righteousness inseparably, though
distinctively. And since Luther associates passive righteousness with theology, and active
righteousness with philosophy and sciences,13 I came to conclude that shame can and
needs to be addressed from both theological and social-scientific perspectives.
Statement of the Problem
Therefore, I find it problematic when pastoral theologians, though describing and
interpreting shame from an interdisciplinary perspective, drawing upon both the social
sciences and theology, propose strategies for the healing of shame only from theological
perspective. Smedes, in Shame and Grace: Healing the Shame We Don’t Deserve,
interprets the experience of shame as follows:
The feeling of shame is about our very selves—not about some bad thing we did
or said but about what we are. It tells us that we are unworthy. Totally. It is not as
if a few seams in the garment of our selves need stitching; the whole fabric is
frayed. We feel that we are unacceptable. And to feel that is a life-wearying
heaviness. Shame-burdened people are the sort whom Jesus had in mind when he
invited the “weary and heavy laden” to trade their heaviness for his lightness.14
Smedes comes to this interpretation of shame by drawing upon the works of
prominent scholars of shame, such as Gershen Kaufman, Helen Block Lewis, Michael
See chapter three, section one, “An Interdisciplinary Framework,” for more details on the nature
of the relationships between the two kinds of righteousness.
12

See the section mentioned above for more details on my interpretation of Luther’s association of
justification or passive righteousness with theology, and of active righteousness with philosophy and
sciences.
13

14

Smedes, Shame and Grace, 6. Emphases in the original.
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Lewis, Donald L. Nathanson, Carl D. Schneider, among others, and upon the works of
renowned theologians, such as John of the Cross, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Reinhold
Niebuhr.
Robert H. Albers, in his book Shame: A Faith Perspective,15 drawing upon the
works of Kaufman, Léon Wurmser, Susan Miller, Nathanson, and many others, and upon
the works of Paul Tillich, and of Eberhard Jüngel, notes that shame should be described
in an interdisciplinary way. He writes, “Much can be learned from the descriptive
analysis provided by researchers and counselors in the psychological disciplines, but in
order to deal holistically with people, the spiritual dimension must also be factored into
total equation.”16
Nevertheless, Smedes states that grace heals shame. “The good news,” he writes,
“is that shame can be healed. I believe that the healing of our feelings of shame gets its
best start with a spiritual experience—specifically, an experience of amazing grace.”17
While he brings only one theological resource to address shame, Albers recommends
several, such as grace, the creation, baptism, theology of the cross, church community,
and justification.18
This attitude of describing and interpreting shame from an interdisciplinary
perspective, but proposing healing for its healing only from a theological perspective, is
true not only at the academic level, as noted above, but also at the grassroots level. Most

15

Robert H. Albers, Shame: A Faith Perspective (New York: Haworth Press, 1995).

16

Ibid., 3.

17

Smedes, Shame and Grace, “To the Reader.”

18

Albers, Shame, 86-108.
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of my interviewees, when asked about the origin of their shame, answered that shame is
both natural and from the devil. However, when asked about how shame should be
healed, they responded, “through prayers, exorcism, and the hearing of the Word of
God.”
I do not doubt the power of prayer and exorcism to heal shame. God promises to
listen to our prayers and to grant us what we ask for, healing of shame included. The New
Testament narratives show that Jesus and the apostles performed healing through
exorcism. Also, I do believe that divine actions such as grace, re-creation, and
justification, which God bequeathed through the death and resurrection of Christ, and
imparts through the proclamation of the Word and the distribution of the Sacraments
(baptism and the Holy Communion), are the ultimate ground for the healing of our
shame. Moreover, I am aware of the “psychological captivity” of pastoral theology,
which has fueled reactions from some pastoral theologians to exclusively use theology as
a normative framework for pastoral care ministry.19
However, I believe with Luther that reality consists of two realms, one heavenly,
and the other earthly.20 The heavenly realm is the realm of the creator, i.e., the realm of
God. The earthly realm is the realm of the creation. A person exists in these two realms
simultaneously. In the heavenly realm, God does everything. No human action is needed.
In the earthly realm, however, both divine action and human action are at work. Shame

19

Cf. Thomas Oden, Classical Pastoral Care (Grand Rapds, MI: Baker Books, 1994); Thomas C.
Oden, Pastoral Theology: Essentials of Ministry (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982); Andrew Purves,
Pastoral Theology in the Classical Tradition (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001);
Andrew Purves, Reconstructing Pastoral Theology: A Christological Foundation (Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2004).
20

I will elaborate more on Luther’s doctrine of the two realms or two kingdoms in chapter two.

9
permeates these two realms of human existence. That is, a person may experience shame
before God (Coram Deo) and before the world (Coram mundo). Therefore, to heal shame
holistically, pastoral theologians need to address it from the perspectives of both divine
action or passive righteousness, the primary subject of theology, and human action or
active righteousness, the primary subject of social sciences.
In fact, the experience of shame is a complex human phenomenon. It has multiple
functions both within the individual personality and for the communities of individuals.21
That is, shame affects the personal and the social life of an individual. Indeed, shame
affects the personal and social as well as the spiritual or theological life of an individual.
Helen Merrell Lynd writes, “Experience of shame may call into question, not only one’s
own adequacy and the validity of the codes of one’s immediate society, but the meaning
of the universe itself.”22 Questioning the meaning of the universe is a deep theological
struggle, for “[t]he heavens declare the glory of God, and the sky above proclaims his
handiwork” (Psalm 19:1, ESV). Again, to holistically address the issue of shame, one
needs to approach it with both theological and social-scientific perspectives.
This dissertation shall therefore propose that pastoral theologians need to address
shame from an interdisciplinary perspective, drawing upon both theology and the social
sciences, not only at the descriptive and the interpretive levels, but also, and most
importantly, at the pragmatic level,23 i.e., the healing of shame.

21

Susan B. Miller, Shame in Context (Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, 1996), 2.

22

Helen Merrell Lynd, On Shame and the Search for Identity (New York: Harcourt, 1958), 57.

23
For more details about the descriptive, interpretive, and pragmatic tasks of practical theology,
see the section entitled “Methodological Framework” below.
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Research Question
The main question this dissertation answers is: What faithful normative
framework allows an interdisciplinary approach for the healing of shame? As the
dissertation unfolds, it will become clear that Luther’s doctrine of the two kinds of
righteousness is the faithful framework that permits the healing of shame from both
theological and social-scientific perspectives.
As mentioned en passant above, Luther distinguishes between two kinds of
righteousness, one passive and the other active. Passive righteousness is the righteousness
of Christ bequeathed to us through the Word and the Sacraments, which we receive
through faith alone, a total trust in God’s Word and promise. This righteousness justifies
us before God (coram Deo), i.e., in the heavenly realm, and is salvific. Active
righteousness, on the other hand, is what we do to serve and to care for the well-being of
the self and the neighbor. It justifies us before the world (coram mundo), i.e., in the
earthly realm, but is not salvific. The two kinds of righteousness, however, are
inseparable; that is, they are not alternatives. We cannot have one without the other. Yet
they are distinct and cannot be confused. Passive righteousness has primacy over active
righteousness. This doctrine of Luther is faithful in that it is biblically grounded, as it
“recognizes and rests upon Christ's observation that human life consists of two kinds of
relationship, one with the author and creator of life, the other with all other creatures
(Matt. 22:37-39).”24

24
Robert Kolb, “Luther on the Two Kinds of Righteousness: Reflections on His Two-Dimensional
Definition of Humanity at the Heart of His Theology,” Lutheran Quarterly 13, no. 4 (1999): 452.

11
According to Luther, passive righteousness is the subject matter of theology, and
active righteousness is where reason plays an important role. Luther associates reason
generally with philosophy and sciences. In other words, the two kinds of righteousness
can be transposed into an interdisciplinary framework where the relationship between
theology and other fields of inquiry, such as philosophy and sciences, is defined by the
features of the relationship between the two kinds of righteousness. That is, theology and
other disciplines are inseparable. They go hand-in-hand. Yet they must be distinguished,
with logical priority assigned to theology.
Addressing pastoral issues, such as shame, from the perspective of the two kinds
of righteousness therefore means that pastoral theologians, to borrow the words of
Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger,
must learn to become “bilingual.” They must learn to be as skilled in the language
or symbol system of theology as they are in that of [the social sciences]. They
must be equipped to interpret and experience themselves and their world in
theological as well as in [social-scientific] terms. They must become linguistically
competent in the one discipline as in the other, interiorizing by practice and
training two very different sets of skills. They must learn how to feel, act, and
think in conformity with two different modes of thought.25
The bilingual capacity of the pastoral theologians needs to be applied at the
descriptive, the interpretive, and the pragmatic tasks of the practical theological
interpretation.

25
Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger, Theology and Pastoral Counseling: A New Interdisciplinary
Approach (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 5.
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Methodological Framework
I have chosen to use Richard Osmer’s model of practical theological
interpretation26 as an overarching framework to guide my work. Osmer’s model has four
tasks:27 the descriptive-empirical, interpretive, normative, and pragmatic. The
descriptive-empirical task, according to Osmer, is a spirituality of presence or priestly
listening through informal, semiformal, and formal attending.28 Informal attending
includes active listening and attentiveness as we interact with others in everyday
interpersonal communication. Semiformal attending “involves the use of specific
methods and activities that provide structure and regularity to our attending.”29 This may
include journaling, and discussion with friends and colleagues. Formal attending
encompasses investigation of specific episode, situation, or context, using scholarly
empirical research.30 Osmer defines episode, situation, and context as follows:
An episode is an incident or event that emerges from the flow of everyday life and
evokes explicit situation and reflection. It occurs in a single setting over a short
period of time. . . . A situation is the broader and longer pattern of events,
relationships, and circumstances in which an episode occurs. It often is best
understood in the form of a narrative in which a particular incident is located
within a longer story. . . . A context is composed of the social and natural systems
in which a situation unfolds.31
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Scholars who have used Osmer’s model of practical theological interpretation have come up
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The descriptive-empirical task, in sum, aims to answer the question “What is
going on?” and gathers data that help determine dynamics and patterns in a particular
episode, situation, or context.32 To fulfill this task, I have explored the patterns and
dynamics of shame among Malagasy by conducting in-depth interviews. The overall goal
of this dissertation is to suggest faithful and effective pastoral care practice, which is
distinctly Lutheran, in relation to the problem and pain of shame in the Malagasy context.
The interpretive task of practical theology is a spirituality of sagely wisdom that
“is characterized by three qualities: thoughtfulness, theoretical interpretation, and wise
judgement.”33 Thoughtfulness includes striving for insight into an individual’s
circumstance in order to treat both the person and the circumstance with consideration
and kindness. Theoretical interpretation is the ability to use theories from the arts and
sciences in order to understand a particular situation, episode, or context and to
thoughtfully respond to it. Wise judgment is the capacity to interpret a particular
situation, episode, or context with recognition of its particularity, discernment of the
ethical ends it might involve, and determination of the most faithful and effective ways to
approach it.34
The interpretive task, in other words, answers the question why something is
happening in a given episode, a situation, or a context by drawing on theories of the arts
and sciences.35 I have drawn upon shame theories from both theological and social-
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scientific perspectives in order to explain and understand patterns and dynamics of shame
among Malagasy, that is, to interpret the findings of my descriptive-empirical task as
mentioned above.
The normative task is a spirituality of prophetic discernment. It engages in
interdisciplinary thinking by drawing upon theological concepts, ethical norms, and/or
good practice in order to interpret specific episodes, situations, or contexts. It answers the
question “What should be going on?”36 To meet this task, I have developed Luther’s
doctrine of the two kinds of righteousness as an interdisciplinary framework for pastoral
care in general, and for the description, interpretation, and healing of shame in particular.
The pragmatic task is a spirituality of servant leadership which seeks to answer
the question “How should we respond?” and looks for strategies that might influence a
particular episode, situation, or context.37 To fulfil this task, I have proposed, from a
social-scientific perspective, that empathy heals shame. In addition, I also have proposed,
from a theological perspective, that the gospel of justification heals shame.
Osmer notes, concerning the four tasks, that “the normative and pragmatic . . . are
central to practical theology as an academic discipline.”38 In this dissertation, therefore,
both the normative and the pragmatic tasks cover two chapters respectively, whereas the
descriptive-empirical and the interpretive moves are given one chapter each.
Furthermore, Osmer conceptualizes the four tasks as a hermeneutical circle; that is, they
interpenetrate one another, allowing the interpreter to start with any of the tasks, yet
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weaving the interpretation of this specific task with the other ones.39 For instance, if an
interpreter choses to start with the descriptive-empirical, he or she must describe in
relation to the interpretive, normative, and pragmatic tasks. In other words, Osmer’s
model suggests that each task shapes the contents and course of the others.
This dissertation begins with the normative task—the two kinds of righteousness
as an interdisciplinary framework. I start with the normative task because it establishes a
theoretical framework ahead of time for the interpretation (interpretive task), the
description (descriptive-empirical task), and the healing (pragmatic task) of shame. The
four tasks indeed interpenetrate one another, with the normative as the overall framework
that ties them all together.
Chapter Overview
This dissertation has seven chapters in total. Chapter one, this introduction, tells
how I become interested in shame, states the problem I address, and explains what my
research question is, and what my overall methodology for the entire work is.
Chapters two and three undertake the normative task. Chapter two discusses the
nature and dynamics of Luther’s doctrine of the two kinds of righteousness and argues
that this doctrine is a dialectical principle which is linked with his doctrine of the two
kingdoms—the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world. A person is made
righteous passively in the kingdom of God and actively in the kingdom of the world.
Chapter two therefore concludes that the two doctrines—the doctrine of the two
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kingdoms and that of the two kinds of righteousness—form Luther’s view of reality and
his anthropology.
Chapter three takes this conclusion further and argues that the two kinds of
righteousness can be transposed into an interdisciplinary framework that delineates the
relationship between theology and other disciplines. The two kinds of righteousness are
inseparable, distinct, and asymmetrical in order. So are theology and other forms of
human knowledge. The two kinds of righteousness as an interdisciplinary framework
therefore operate within the Chalcedonian model of interdisciplinarity developed by
James E. Loder and Hunsinger.40 Moreover, chapter three provides a critique of the
African understanding of personhood. The purpose of this critique is to explain why the
two kinds of righteousness, compared to the African understanding of personhood, is a
better normative framework for pastoral theology in general, and for the description,
interpretation, and healing of shame in particular.
Chapter four functions as the interpretive task and interprets shame from both
social-scientific and theological perspectives. The chapter demonstrates that shame has
three forms—discretion, disgrace, and internalized. Discretion shame, a sense of shame
before an act, is integral to being human and needs to be nurtured. Disgrace shame, the
experience of being ashamed, is painful and disintegrative, and thus needs to be healed.
Moreover, disgrace shame can be internalized and creates what is called “a shame-based
identity.” Discretion shame, disgrace shame, and internalized shame all have personal,
social, and theological dynamics.
40
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Chapter five serves as the descriptive-empirical task and presents new findings on
the patterns and dynamics of shame in the Malagasy context. It shows that shame among
Malagasy has three patterns—fahalalana menatra, fahafahambaraka, and
hasaronkenatra. The three patterns correspond respectively with the three patterns of
shame described in the interpretive task—discretion shame, disgrace shame, and
internalized shame. Chapter five, furthermore, describes the personal, social, and
theological aspects of the three patterns of shame among Malagasy.
Chapters six and seven take on the pragmatic task. Chapter six, suggesting healing
for shame from a social-scientific perspective, claims that empathy is the best antidote for
shame. Moreover, chapter six argues that empathy generates not only healing for shame,
but also integration, the heart of well-being. Chapter six concludes with the suggestion
that what is needed for the cultivation of empathy is NVC.
Chapter seven, proposing healing for shame from a theological perspective,
asserts that God heals our shame through the gift of justification. Since justification is
received through faith alone, and faith comes through the Word of God, chapter seven
claims that preaching plays an important role for the healing of shame, and that the
gospel of justification, the subject matter of preaching, should be proclaimed and heard as
addressing both our guilt and our shame.
Significance of this Study
This work is important at least on three levels. Academically, this work, as far as I
know, is the first to explicitly transpose Luther’s doctrine of the two kinds of
righteousness as an interdisciplinary framework for pastoral theology in general and for
the description, interpretation, and healing of shame in particular. Moreover, it is the first
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to explicitly interpret the conditions of the relationship between the two kinds of
righteousness using the Chalcedonian language.
Pastoral theology is interdisciplinary in nature. It draws from theology and the
social sciences. By establishing the two kinds of righteousness as an interdisciplinary
framework, this work provides pastoral theologians with lucid description of the nature of
the relationship between theology and social sciences. It describes the relationship
between these two fields as inseparable, distinct, and asymmetrical in order, with
theology having logical precedence over social sciences.
This Chalcedonian language has also been used to describe the relationship
between the divine act of justification and theology, shame and guilt, shame because of
our sinful nature and internalized shame, and faith and empathy. Each duo is described as
inseparable, distinct, and asymmetrical in order. Faith and empathy, for instance, are
understood as inseparable, yet distinct, with faith having primacy over empathy.
This work, furthermore, interprets shame from the vantage point of the two kinds
of righteousness as a framework, while at the same time interpreting the framework from
a perspective of shame. This is academically important because practical theologian
Pattison, in his book Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology, suggests that theologians should
interpret shame from specific theological ideas while also interpreting specific
theological ideas from the perspective of shame.41 This work, in a sense, is a response to
Pattison’s request. The result of the interpretation is that this work provides a new
language for the understanding of shame, law, and justification. Specifically, it describes
shame as an experience of disintegration both coram Deo and coram mundo; law as a
41
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sense of shame, on the one hand, and as a generator of shame, on the other; and
justification as a divine gift that addresses both our guilt (what we do) and our shame
(who we are).
Personally, this work establishes the ground of my theological reflections as a
Lutheran pastoral theologian. First, the two kinds of righteousness as an interdisciplinary
framework provides me with a faithful and effective normative framework, not only for
the description, interpretation, and healing of shame, as I focus on in this particular work,
but also for the description, interpretation, and healing of other pastorally-related issues,
such as addiction, trauma, mental illness, depression, etc., which I am likely to address in
my future works as a scholar. In other words, as a pastoral theologian, I will use the two
kinds of righteousness as an interdisciplinary framework as the basis for my theory and
practice of pastoral care.
Second, guilt has been the main lens Christian theologians have used to interpret
salvation in general and justification in particular. Interpreting justification from a guilt
perspective is inadequate, however. Guilt is behavioral. It is partial. Shame is ontological.
Hence, it is global, involving the whole self. For the interpretation of salvation and
justification to be adequate, shame has to be considered. I will focus my theological
reflections on interpreting shame theologically, but also on interpreting justification from
a shame perspective, without neglecting the importance of guilt. Theology, to some
extent, is autobiographical; thus, my theological reflections are shaped and influenced by
my personal experience with shame.
On the ecclesial level, I believe this work provides both the lay and ordained
ministers in the Malagasy Lutheran Church (MLC) with an awareness and understanding
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of the patterns and dynamics of shame among the toby shepherds, which is, according to
John Patton, “essential for doing pastoral [care and] counseling.”42 I also believe that
reflecting theologically from a shame perspective, especially out of an awareness of my
own shame-proneness and my knowledge of the dynamics of shame among the
Malagasy, helps me as a teacher of theology to better train my students, the future doctor
ecclesiae, for their pastoral care and counseling ministry.
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CHAPTER TWO
CORAM DEO ET CORAM MUNDO: MARTIN LUTHER’S DOCTRINE OF THE
TWO KINDS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS
As aforementioned in the introductory chapter, Richard Osmer’s model of
practical theological interpretation is the overarching methodology that frames this
dissertation as a whole. Osmer’s model has four distinct yet interconnected tasks: the
descriptive-empirical, interpretive, normative, and pragmatic. These four tasks function
as a hermeneutical circle, which allows an interpreter to be able to start with any of the
tasks, but to circle back to tasks that have been explored. I also mentioned that, in this
work, I have chosen to start with the normative task which, answering the question “What
should be going on?,” is a spirituality of prophetic discernment that engages in
interdisciplinary thinking by drawing upon theological concepts, ethical norms, and/or
good practice, in order to interpret specific episodes, situations, or contexts. To fulfill this
task, I draw mainly upon a theological concept—Martin Luther’s doctrine of the two
kinds of righteousness—and establish it as an interdisciplinary framework for pastoral
care in general, and for the description, interpretation, and healing of shame in particular.
My exploration of this theological concept covers two chapters—the present one
and the next. The present chapter discusses the nature and dynamics of the two kinds of
righteousness as Luther understands them. Chapter three will transpose Luther’s two
kinds of righteousness into an interdisciplinary framework.
21
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The Nature and Dynamics of the Two Kinds of Righteousness in Luther
Luther understands reality as consisting of two distinct, but inseparable, realms,
one heavenly, and the other earthly.1 The heavenly realm, or the kingdom of God, is
governed by the Word and the Holy Spirit. It is the kind of kingdom that brings about
salvation and produces inner righteousness, freedom, and peace. The earthly realm, or the
kingdom of the world, is ruled by the law and by reason and is the kind of kingdom that
produces outer righteousness, freedom, and peace.
Luther teaches that a person exists in these two realms simultaneously and must
satisfy at one and the same time the respective rules that govern them. The rules are that
in his or her existence in the kingdom of God (coram Deo), a person is made righteous
only through faith, without works; but in his or her existence in the kingdom of the world
(coram mundo), he or she is made righteous through works that serve the well-being of
the self and the neighbor. In other words, coram Deo, a person is made righteous
passively, but coram mundo, he or she is made righteous actively.
Luther’s doctrine of the two kinds of righteousness—passive and active—is
therefore a dialectical principle which is associated with his doctrine of the two
kingdoms—the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world. To understand the nature
and dynamics of his doctrine of the two kinds of righteousness, one has to understand the
nature and dynamics of his doctrine of the two kingdoms. Consequently, this section will
look at the nature and dynamics of Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms briefly before

Luther interchangeably calls the first realm “the kingdom of God,” or “the kingdom of Christ,”
and interchangeably describes it with the following adjectives: “heavenly,” “spiritual,” or “eternal.”
Likewise, he calls the second realm “the kingdom of the world,” “the kingdom of the law,” or “the
kingdom of the sword,” and interchangeably describes it as “earthly,” “secular,” or “temporal.”
1

23
it moves on to explore the nature and dynamics of his doctrine of the two kinds of
righteousness at length.
Luther’s Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms
The doctrine of the two kingdoms is central to Luther’s thought and theology.
That is, his thought and theology, even since his early works, developed around this
notion. “The first clear use of the two-kingdoms concept,” William J. Wright rightly
notes, “may be found in Luther’s early commentaries on the psalms, which were written
during the years 1513 to 1515.”2 “These commentaries,” however, Wright continues,
“were not prompted by political agendas of any kind, for Luther had not yet become the
great Reformer.”3 The first explicit statements Luther as a Reformer made concerning the
doctrine of the two kingdoms are found in a series of six sermons he delivered in Weimar
on October 19 and 24-26, 1522.4
Luther later on developed the themes of these sermons (especially the two he
preached on the 24th and 25th) and formed the treatise known as Temporal Authority: To
What Extent It Should Be Obeyed.5 This treatise was published in March of 1523 and
fully develops the doctrine of the two kingdoms. He, of course, kept refining the
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formulation of this doctrine throughout his career as a Reformer. However, W. D. J.
Cargill Thompson convincingly argues that it “is the language in which [this doctrine is]
expressed which changes more than the ideas themselves.”6 Therefore, my exploration of
Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms will focus solely on this treatise.
According to Luther in this treatise, “the children of Adam and all mankind” may
be divided into two groups; one group belongs to the kingdom of God and the other one
to the kingdom of the world.”7 The first group comprises Christians who are true
believers and for whom Christ is Lord and King. These people do not need the law, for
they “have in their hearts the Holy Spirit, who both teaches and makes them to do
injustice to no one, [and] to love everyone.”8 If the world was filled with these people,
there would be no need of the law to govern human life, because everybody would
conform to God’s will. But since not everyone in the world is Christian, God establishes
the government of the law “so that those who are not Christians may through the law be
restrained outwardly from evil deeds.”9 Thus, the second group of people comprises those
who are not Christians and are under the law.
Luther notes, however, that a Christian exists simultaneously in both kingdoms—
the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world. This is because a Christian is
simultaneously saint and sinner (simul iustus et peccator). Also, the two kingdoms are
ordained by God. A Christian, therefore, at one and the same time must satisfy the rules
6
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that govern the two kingdoms.10 The kingdom of God is governed by the Word and the
Holy Spirit, the kingdom of the world by the law and reason.11
The government of the Word and the Spirit seeks to produce “Christians and
righteous people under Christ.”12 The righteousness this government brings about,
however, is received through faith alone. That is, it is a passive righteousness that cannot
be attained through the law and reason, “[f]or faith is a free act, to which no one can be
forced. Indeed, it is a work of God in the spirit, not something which outward authority
should compel or create.”13 A Christian therefore must be a person of faith.
The government of the law, on the other hand, seeks to produce righteousness
through service that is “done in love . . . toward the benefit, honor, and salvation of
others, and not toward the pleasure, benefit, honor, comfort, and salvation of the self.”14
This kind of righteousness is administered by the law and thus by reason because “reason
may be the highest law and the master of all administration of law.”15 A Christian
therefore must be a law-abiding person.
Luther notes that though anyone may perform this kind of righteousness because
it can be coerced by the law and administered by reason, it can be properly done only
through faith and thus only by Christians, “[f]or without the Holy Spirit in the heart no
one becomes truly righteous, no matter how fine the works he [or she] does [before
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humankind].”16 However, Luther warns that the government of the Word and the Spirit
cannot rule alone in both the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world, for “where
the spiritual government alone prevails over land or people, there wickedness is given
free rein and the door is open for all manner of rascality, for the world as a whole cannot
receive or comprehend it.”17 Likewise, the government of the law and reason cannot rule
alone in both kingdoms, because “where temporal government or law alone prevails,
there sheer hypocrisy is inevitable, even though the commandments be God’s very own.
For without the Holy Spirit in the heart no one becomes truly righteous, no matter how
fine the works he [or she] does.”18 Luther therefore concludes:
For this reason one must carefully distinguish between these two governments.
Both must be permitted to remain; the one to produce righteousness, the other to
bring about external peace and prevent evil deeds. Neither one is sufficient in the
world without the other. No one can become righteous in the sight of God by
means of the temporal government, without Christ’s spiritual government.19
In sum, Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms consists of the overlapping of the
two simultaneous realms of human existence—the kingdom of God and the kingdom of
the world—with the two rules or governments—the Word and the Spirit for the former,
and the law and reason for the latter—that respectively govern these two realms. The
kingdom of God, under the government of the Word and the Spirit, brings about a
righteousness that is a matter which concerns the salvation of the soul, something that
God alone can do, for “the soul is taken out of all human hands and placed under the
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authority of God alone.”20 The kingdom of the world, under the government of the law
and reason, aims to produce personal and social well-being, and peace for the world. As
we shall see below, Luther’s doctrine of the two kinds of righteousness is placed into this
complex doctrine of the two kingdoms.
Luther’s Doctrine of the Two Kinds of Righteousness
Unlike his doctrine of the two kingdoms, Luther’s doctrine of the two kinds of
righteousness permeates his works only from 1518 onward. For my discussion of this
doctrine, I shall limit myself within the following works: his sermon “Two Kinds of
Righteousness” (1519);21 his treatise The Freedom of a Christian (1520);22 his Treatise
on Good Works (1520);23 the preface to his Lectures on Galatians (1535), entitled “The
Argument of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians;”24 and his treatise The Disputation
concerning Justification (1536).25
I have chosen these five particular works because here Luther explicitly explains
his view of the two kinds of righteousness. Also, these works, though written with
different nuances and emphases and using different terminologies to describe the two
kinds of righteousness, show how consistent Luther was in regard to this doctrine
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throughout his career as a Reformer. These works expand from 1519 to 1536, yet they
hold more or less the same substance of the doctrine.
The sermon entitled “Two Kinds of Righteousness,” which he preached in 1519,
is the first place where Luther began to explicitly articulate his doctrine of the two kinds
of righteousness. He asserts in this sermon:
There are two kinds of Christian righteousness. . . . The first is alien
righteousness, that is, the righteousness of another, instilled from without. This is
the righteousness of Christ by which he justifies through faith. . . . The second
kind of righteousness is our proper righteousness, not because we alone work it,
but because we work with that first and alien righteousness.26
Luther develops the sermon by describing the nature and dynamics of the two
kinds of righteousness that he mentioned. First, he describes the alien righteousness as
total and complete. That is, it “is an infinite righteousness, and one that swallows up all
sins in a moment, for it is impossible that sin should exist in Christ.”27 Moreover, he
describes this total righteousness from Christ as given to us in baptism,28 and as received
only through faith. “Through faith in Christ . . . Christ’s righteousness becomes our
righteousness and all that he has becomes ours; rather, he himself becomes ours.”29
Luther eventually claims that our alien righteousness is instilled in us by God without our
own works, by grace alone.30
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Second, Luther describes the second kind of righteousness as “the product of the
righteousness of the first type, actually its fruit and consequence.”31 He explains that this
righteousness “is that manner of life spent profitably in good works, in the first place, in
slaying the flesh and crucifying the desires with respect to the self. . . . In the second
place, [it] consists in love to one’s neighbor, and in the third place, in meekness and fear
toward God.”32 Luther thereby taught his hearers that the second type of righteousness
seeks the well-being of the neighbor, so he addressed them and said:
[Y]ou are powerful, not that you make the weak weaker by oppression, but that
you may make them powerful by raising them up and defending them. You are
wise, not in order to laugh at the foolish and thereby make them more foolish, but
that you may undertake to teach them as yourself would wish to be taught. You
are righteous that you may vindicate and pardon the unrighteous, not that you may
only condemn, disparage, judge, and punish.33
Luther summarizes his exposition of the two kinds of righteousness in this sermon
by saying that “through the first righteousness arises the voice of the bridegroom who
says to the soul, ‘I am yours,’ but through the second comes the voice of the bride who
answers, ‘I am yours.’”34 Thus, Luther understands the first kind of righteousness, which
is the alien righteousness of Christ instilled to us in baptism and received through faith, as
the basis for the second one, which consists of goods works performed toward the self,
others, and God. The two kinds of righteousness are distinct, yet connected, and ordered
with the first kind of righteousness being the source of the second.
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In the treatise The Freedom of a Christian, where he discusses the nature of the
Christian freedom, Luther sets down the following two propositions: “A Christian is a
perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all,
subject to all.”35 To support these two propositions, he presupposes that a Christian has a
twofold nature, consisting of both a spiritual and bodily nature. The spiritual nature refers
to the soul, spiritual, inner, or new person, whereas the bodily refers to the flesh, carnal,
outward, or old person.36
There is only one thing that can set the spiritual person or, as Luther prefers, “the
inner person,” free or make him or her righteous. That one thing is the Word of God,
which “is the gospel of God concerning his Son, who was made flesh, suffered, rose from
the dead, and was glorified through the Spirit who sanctifies.”37 This Word of God
“cannot be received and cherished by any works whatever but only by faith.”38 And faith
“is produced and preserved in us by preaching why Christ came, what he brought and
bestowed, what benefit it is to us to accept him.”39 This means that Christ ought “to be
preached to the end that faith in him may be established that he may not only be Christ,
but be Christ for you and me, and that what is said of him and is denoted in his name may
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be effectual in us.”40 The inner person is therefore made free and righteous only by the
Word and by faith.
Indeed, there are three benefits of faith. First, faith frees a person from the
bondage of the law and works.41 A person does not do good works to be made righteous
and free. Rather, salvation and freedom are free gift from God bestowed unto us. Second,
faith honors God in that it renders to God the highest and the most reverent regard as it
considers God truthful and trustworthy.42 Luther writes, “Nothing more excellent than
this can be ascribed to God. The very highest worship of God is this that we ascribe to
him truthfulness, righteousness, and whatever else should be ascribed to one who is
trusted.”43 The third benefit of faith is that it unites the person of faith with Christ as a
bride.44 That is, it makes a perfect marriage between Christ and the believing person. And
this marital union makes the person of faith have everything that Christ has because,
through faith, Christ and all his righteousness belong to the believing person. Therefore,
faith “is a treasure beyond comparison which brings with it complete salvation.”45 In
other words, faith makes the inner person a “perfectly free lord of all, subject to none.”
On the other hand, faith makes the outer person a “perfectly dutiful servant of all,
subject to all.” That is, faith does not free a person from works; rather, it pushes him or
her to serve the well-being of the neighbor through good works. Luther, however, notes,
40
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“Good works do not make a good [person], but a good [person] does good works.”
Likewise, “evil works do not make a wicked [person], but a wicked [person] does evil
work. . . . A good or a bad house does not make a good or a bad builder; but a good or a
bad builder makes a good or a bad house.”46
Good works consist of self-discipline and service to the neighbor. First, a person
must control his or her own body and desire from leisure and evil lusts. He or she does so
through “fastings, watchings, labors, and other reasonable disciplines.”47 The goal of this
self-discipline is to subject the bodily nature or the outer person to the Holy Spirit so that
it may conform to the spiritual nature or the inner person and not revolt against faith.48
Second, a person serves the needs of the neighbor just as God through Christ serves him
or her and his or her needs.49 Luther describes this in the first person as follows:
Although I am an unworthy and condemned man, my God has given me in Christ
all the riches of righteousness and salvation without any merit on my part, out of
pure, free mercy, so that from now on I need nothing except faith which believes
that this is true. Why should I not therefore freely, joyfully, with all my heart, and
with an eager will do all things which I know are pleasing and acceptable to such
a Father who has overwhelmed me with his inestimable riches? I will therefore
give myself as a Christ to my neighbor, just as Christ offered himself to me; I will
do nothing in this life except what I see is necessary, profitable, and salutary to
my neighbor, since through faith I have an abundance of all good things in
Christ.50
Luther, in this treatise, shows that a Christian is made free coram Deo only by the
Word of God, through faith; but he or she coram mundo is made righteous through self46
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discipline that controls the body from selfishness, in order to freely serve the neighbor
out of love through good works. Luther concludes that
a Christian lives not in himself [or herself], but in Christ and his [or her] neighbor.
Otherwise he [or she] is not a Christian. He or [she] lives in Christ through faith,
in his [or her] neighbor through love. By faith he [or she] caught up beyond
himself [or herself] into God. By love he [or she] descends beneath himself [or
herself] into his [or her] neighbor.51
The Treatise on Good Works, a teaching on “the real good works which spring
from faith,”52 discusses the connection between faith and good works. As Luther writes,
“In this present book I have wanted to show how we should practice and use faith in all
good works, and how we should let faith be our chief work.”53 Luther discusses the
relationship between faith and good works by expounding the Ten Commandments. He
argues that all commandments are fulfilled in the first, “Thou shalt have no other gods,”
and that faith is “the true fulfilling of the first commandment.”54
As such, faith fulfils all commandments; and since it does so, it also makes all
works good. This means that works are not good in themselves, no matter how wonderful
they look and what splendid names they have. They are good only when done in faith,55
for faith makes a person righteous, and a righteous person does righteous works. But
righteous works do not produce a righteous person, because “faith does not originate in
works; neither do works create faith.”56 Rather, faith “must spring up and flow from the
51
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blood and wounds and death of Christ.”57 Luther argues, “We never read that the Holy
Spirit was given to anybody because he had performed some works, but always when
[they] have heard the gospel of Christ and the mercy of God.” Therefore, he concludes
that faith “must arise at all times from th[e] same word and from no other source.”58
Thus, faith comes “only from Christ, [and is] freely promised and freely given.”59
Moreover, faith is exercised in good works both toward God and toward the
neighbor.60 The first three commandments, or “the first table of the Law,” as Luther puts
it, concern the good works we exercise toward God. These works are to trust God, to hear
sermons, to pray, to praise, to sing, and to laud and to magnify God’s glory, honor, and
name.61 Luther summarizes the first three commandments as follows: “The first
commandment tells how our inmost heart should think about God; the second, how the
words of our mouth should express this. The third tells us how we should relate ourselves
to God in works.”62 The last seven commandments concern the good works we exercise
toward the neighbor. These commandments teach and encourage us to perform good
works that seek the benefits of the neighbor.63
So in this treatise, Luther teaches that faith produces good works, and not vice
versa. Faith comes from the Word of God only. Good works out of faith go to two
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directions—toward God and toward the neighbor. Toward God, good works manifest in
prayer, praise, and worship. Toward the neighbor, they manifest in service that seeks the
well-being of others.
In “The Argument of St Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians,” his preface to the 1535
Lectures on Galatians, Luther distinguishes what he calls “the righteousness of faith” or
“Christian righteousness” from other kinds of righteousness such as “political
righteousness,” “ceremonial righteousness,” and “righteousness of the Law or of the
Decalogue.”64 He describes the righteousness of faith as passive, and all the others as
active.65 He also uses the expression “the righteousness of the Law” to describe the active
righteousness.
The two kinds of righteousness—passive and active—are placed into the two
kingdoms.
We set forth two worlds, as it were, one of them heavenly and the other earthly.
Into these we place these two kinds of righteousness, which are distinct and
separated from each other. The righteousness of the Law is earthly and deals with
earthly things; by it we perform good works. . . . But th[e] righteousness [of faith]
is heavenly and passive.”66
Luther’s goal in writing this preface and the entire commentary is to encourage
both clergy and laity to diligently learn the art of distinguishing between the two kinds of

64

Luther describes the three other kinds of righteousness as follows: [R]ighteousness is of many
kinds. There is a political righteousness, which the emperor, the princes of the world, philosophers, and
lawyer consider. There is also a ceremonial righteousness, which human traditions teach, as, for example,
the traditions of the pope and other traditions. Parents and teachers may teach this righteousness without
danger, because they do not attribute to it any power to make satisfaction for sin, to placate God, and to
earn grace; but they teach that these ceremonies are necessary only for moral discipline and for certain
observances. There is, in addition to these, yet another righteousness, the righteousness of the Law or of the
Decalogue, which Moses teaches. We, too, teach this, but after the doctrine of faith. LW 26:4.
65

Ibid., 4-5.

66

Ibid., 8.

36
righteousness, in order that they may know how far they should obey the Law.67 This is
important for Luther because “our theology,” he claims, consists of the distinction
between the two: “This is our theology by which we teach a precise distinction between
these two kinds of righteousness, the active and the passive, so that morality and faith,
works and grace, secular society and religion may not be confused. Both are necessary,
but both must be kept within their limits.”68 Moreover, distinguishing between the two
kinds of righteousness is an important art because the two remain as long as a Christian
lives. For as long as a Christian lives, he or she is simultaneously saint and sinner. Thus,
passive righteousness or the righteousness of faith applies to the new person in Christ,
whereas the active righteousness or the righteousness of the Law to the old being.69
Passive righteousness is “the righteousness of grace, mercy, and the forgiveness
of sins. In other words, this is the righteousness of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, which
we do not perform but receive, which we do not have but accept, when God the father
grants it to us through Jesus Christ.”70 Active righteousness, on the other hand, consists
of the works a person performs and which proceed from social norms, ecclesiastical
traditions, and the commandments of God.71 Active righteousness does not justify a
person before God, however. Rather, it serves social order and outward peace.
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The two kinds of righteousness complement each other. A person, however, has
to be justified by the righteousness of faith first before his or her works become good and
righteous.72 That is, passive righteousness is the basis for the active, and not vice versa.
“Therefore,” Luther concludes, “we always repeat, urge, and inculcate this doctrine of
faith or Christian righteousness, so that it may be observed by continuous use and may be
precisely distinguished from the active righteousness of the Law. (For by this doctrine
alone and through it alone is the church built, and in this it consists.)”73 “For if the
doctrine of justification is lost,” he insists, “the whole of Christian doctrine is lost.”74
The task of Christian theology, according to Luther in the preface of the
commentary on Galatians, is to distinguish between the passive and the active
righteousness. Passive righteousness consists of the righteousness of God granted to us
through Jesus Christ, which we receive through faith alone. This kind of righteousness
belongs to the heavenly kingdom, the kingdom of God. Active righteousness consists of
the good works we do for the church, for the community in general, and for God. This
kind of righteousness belongs to the earthly kingdom, the kingdom of the world. The goal
of the distinction between the two kinds of righteousness, however, is to acknowledge
that passive righteousness is the basis for and the hub of active righteousness. That is,
Luther’s point is not to denigrate good works or to discount our service of neighbor.
Rather, his point is to properly order service of neighbor so that it flows from divine
action—from what God has done in us—so that none of us might boast before God
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In The Disputation concerning Justification, in which he interprets Paul’s words
in Romans 3:28 (“For we hold that a person is justified by faith apart from works
prescribed by the law”), Luther writes, “It is clear enough from this passage that the
method of justifying [a person] before God must be distinguished from the method of
justifying him [or her] before [humans].”75 Here Luther clearly places the two kinds of
righteousness into the two simultaneous worlds or realms of human existence—coram
Deo and coram mundo.
Coram Deo, Luther contends, faith alone justifies. Through faith in Christ, “our
sins are forgiven in the sight of God, and this is called inward righteousness.”76 True
faith, however, produces love which manifests in good works toward the neighbor. Thus
good works justify that we have been justified by God: “This love shows all [humans]
that we have remissions of sins and that we have been pronounced righteous by God, and
this is called outward righteousness.”77 There are therefore two kinds of justification, one
coram Deo and the other coram mundo. Justification coram Deo, which happens between
God and human, is the efficient cause of justification coram mundo, which manifests
between human and human.
Where justification is between God and [hu]man, this is from the efficient cause.
The other is corporal and outward, which takes place between [hu]man and
[hu]man; this is from the effect. Before God, faith is necessary, not works. Before
[human] works and love are necessary, which reveal us to be righteous in our own
eyes and before the world.78
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Moreover, justification coram Deo is twofold. “[God] first purifies by imputation,
then he gives the Holy Spirit, through whom he purifies even in substance. Faith cleanses
through remissions of sins, the Holy Spirit cleanses through the effect. This is divine
cleansing and purification which is let down from heaven, by faith and the Holy Spirit.”79
In other words, justification coram Deo is both forgiveness of sins and re-creation.
This disputation shows that there are two kinds of justification: coram Deo and
coram mundo. Coram Deo, a person is justified through faith. This kind of justification
consists of forgiveness of sins and re-creation. Coram mundo, a person is justified
through love manifested in good works.
Conclusion
The two kinds of righteousness in Luther correspond and are intertwined with the
two kingdoms in which a person exist simultaneously—the kingdom of God and the
kingdom of the world, or the realms coram Deo and coram mundo—and which are ruled
by two distinct governments—the Word and the Spirit on one side, and the law and
reason on the other. Coram Deo, under the government of the Word and the Spirit, we are
passively made righteous. God justifies us by bestowing the righteousness of Christ upon
us. For Luther, passive righteousness, which he customarily labels as justification, is
inseparable from the incarnation, the cross, and the resurrection of Christ. Philip S.
Watson writes,
Luther’s conception of the Work of Christ has fundamentally the same
significance as his doctrine of justification. He speaks of the two in the same
breath and in identical terms. . . . Luther maintains that [human beings] are
justified and saved by Christ’s work and not by their own. To deny the divinity of
79
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Christ, therefore, is to deny the article of justification, and to reject the article of
justification is to reject the divinity of Christ.80
Christ’s righteousness is bequeathed to us through the proclamation of the Word
and the distribution of the Sacraments. I add “sacraments” because in the sermon “Two
Kinds of Righteousness,” Luther mentions that our alien or passive righteousness is given
to us in baptism.81 This is the only instance in which he connects the gift of this
righteousness with baptism. And nowhere in all the five works listed does he mention any
connection between this righteousness and the Holy Communion. However, when one
looks at Luther’s description of the benefits of baptism and the Holy Communion as he
explains them in The Small Catechism (1529), one will see that Luther assigns to the
sacraments the same benefits he gives to the Word.
Baptism, he writes in the Small Catechism, “brings about forgiveness of sins,
redeems from death and the devil, and gives eternal salvation.”82 It is true that he defines
baptism as “not simply plain water [but as] water enclosed in God’s command and
connected with God’s Word.”83 And he writes that
without the Word of God the water is plain water and not a baptism, but with the
Word of God it is a baptism, that is, a grace-filled water of life and a “bath of the
new birth in the Holy Spirt,” as St. Paul says to Titus in chapter 3[:5-8], “through
the bath of rebirth and renewal of the Holy Spirit, which he richly poured out over
us through Jesus Christ our Savior, so that through that very grace we may be
righteous and heirs in hope of eternal life.”84
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Nevertheless, Luther believes that baptism affects forgiveness of sins and brings
about new life. Moreover, “Forgiveness of sin, life, and salvation are given to us in the
sacrament,”85 he writes, concerning the Holy Communion before adding, “Eating and
drinking certainly do not do it, but rather, the words that are recorded: ‘given for you’ and
‘shed for you for the forgiveness of sins.’ These words, when accompanied by the
physical eating and drinking, are the essential thing in the sacrament.”86 For Luther,
therefore, righteousness coram Deo is granted to us through the Word and the
Sacraments.
We receive this kind of righteousness only through faith, a total trust in God to be
a God of mercy and grace. And faith is the fruit of the Word also: “So faith comes from
what is heard, and what is heard comes through the word of Christ” (Romans 10:17). We
receive this righteousness through faith alone because, in the words of Luther, it “is a
righteousness hidden in mystery, which the world does not understand. In fact, Christians
themselves do not adequately understand it or grasp it in the midst of their temptations.”87
In other words, righteousness coram Deo, or passive righteousness, cannot be
comprehended by human reason. Klaus Schwarzwäller, in his foreword to Mattes’ book
The Role of Justification in Contemporary Theology, writes that
the “article” of justification is neither a formula nor a theological conception. . . . .
It is no more a formula or a conception than is faith itself. Faith means a personal
commitment, a reality, or even the reality of my life. Accordingly, the “article” of
justification cannot be examined or handled as if it were a thing or a wording or
something similar. It describes and clarifies the reality of our lives as Christians.
It is therefore impossible to deal with it properly from any point of view “beyond”
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our own condition. There is no effective “beyond,” any more than there is a place
to stand “beyond” our solar system.88
This righteousness secures our being and identity before and in God, and is
twofold in nature. First, it is forgiveness of sins, proclaimed in the words of absolution
(“Your sins are forgiven”) and in the words of the Holy Communion (“This is my body
given for you, and this is my blood shed for you, for the forgiveness of sins”). Second, it
is new birth, resurrection, or new life, for, as Luther writes, “where there is forgiveness of
sin, there is also life and salvation.”89 Baptism, by definition, is death to sin and
resurrection to new life in Christ (Romans 6:3-4). This righteousness is therefore a
holistic reality which justifies us both from what we do through forgiveness of sins, and
from who we are through new life. Gerhard Forde confirms this when he writes,
There are two basic metaphors (they are something more than metaphors . . . ) at
the root of Pauline/Reformation theology. One we can call the moral or legal
metaphor, which speaks in terms of law, morality, justice, and justification. The
other is the death-life metaphor, which speaks in terms of mortality, dying to the
old and raising to the new life in Christ and the Spirit.90
Unfortunately, the legal language, that is, justification understood as forgiveness
of sins, tends to be predominant in the Lutheran tradition, whereas justification
understood as new life or resurrection has been often left out of the discussion. Forde,
therefore, makes a wakeup-call that “the explosive character of the Reformation’s
confessional message can come to light once again if the death-life language is recovered
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and restored to its proper place.”91 Recovering and restoring the resurrection or new life
language is also important for the healing of shame, as I will discuss in chapter seven of
this dissertation. But here I would simply claim that righteousness coram Deo is a holistic
righteousness in that it is for both our being (new life) and our deeds (forgiveness of
sins).
Luther assigns primacy to passive righteousness or righteousness coram Deo.
This is why the doctrine of justification is so central to his theology that he claims in the
preface to the commentary on Galatians that “by this doctrine alone and through it alone
is the church built, and in this it consists;”92 and that “if [this doctrine] is lost, the whole
of Christian doctrine is lost.”93 Indeed, the Lutheran tradition has maintained that the
doctrine of justification is the article upon which the Church stands and falls (articulus
stantis et cadentis ecclesiae).
Einar Billing is therefore right when he asserts the following: “Anyone wishing to
study Luther would indeed be in no peril of going astray were he [or she] to follow this
rule: never believe that you have a correct understanding of a thought of Luther before
you have succeeded in reducing it to a simple corollary of the thought of the forgiveness
of sins.”94 In fact, the doctrine of justification is the hub of Luther’s theology, where
everything else springs.95 Oswald Bayer writes, “Luther’s teaching about creation, his
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teaching about Christology, and his teaching about the judgment of the world as the
consummation of the world are each articulated within the framework of his teaching
about justification.”96
However, at the same time, Luther insists that coram mundo, under the
government of the law and reason, we are actively justified: we do everything we can for
the sake of the well-being of the self and of the neighbor. We do so to justify and to
witness before our eyes and that of the world that we have been justified by God, not that
we can justify ourselves, but because “we are what [God] has made us, created in Christ
Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand to be our way of life” (Ephesians
2:10).
Luther frames righteousness coram mundo as consisting of good works toward
the self, the neighbor, and God. That is, this kind of righteousness goes in two
directions—vertically, toward God, and horizontally, toward the world. Active
righteousness toward God must not be confused with the passive righteousness coram
Deo. The former, which manifests in prayer, praise, and worship, is our response to the
latter, which is the divine gift of forgiveness and new life imparted to us through faith
and the Holy Spirit. Active righteousness toward God is the consequence or the fruit of
God’s righteousness toward us. What we do for God through prayer, praise, and worship
does not justify us before Him. We pray because God promises to listen to us, and we
praise and worship God because we have been saved.
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Active righteousness toward the world manifests toward the self and other human
beings. Toward the self it manifests in self-discipline that controls the self from
selfishness or sin, for sin is the urge to pursue selfish interests in everything. Toward
others, it manifests in familial, social, political, and economic justice. Luther actually
frames righteousness coram mundo within what is known as “the three divine orders,”
“the three estates,” or “the three hierarchies”—household (œconomia), politics (politia),
and church (ecclesia)—which, Luther believes, are spheres created and ordained by God
for faith to be active in love.97
Wright notes that when Luther talked about œconomia or household, “he was not
only talking about the institutions of marriage and raising children, but all of the
institutions involved in living and earning a livelihood.”98 In other words, “one may call
[the order of œconomia] the order of daily life. Moreover, Wright writes,
It is important to understand that, while the church was responsible for duties of
the spiritual kingdom on earth (i.e., during humankind’s physical, temporal
existence), as the third divine order it also represented a human institution, with
physical and temporal responsibilities. There were purely worldly responsibilities
included in the work of the church, such as paying the pastor’s salary and
repairing sanctuary. Even activities that had spiritual purposes involved physical,
temporal input. Luther said that baptism, preaching the gospel, and the Lord’s
Supper were externals because it was only the Word that made them effective for
salvation. External matters, therefore, were not limited to the institutions of daily
life and politics.99
We exercise our active righteousness within the spheres of daily life, politics, and
church institutions.
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In conclusion, the doctrine of the two kingdoms and that of the two kinds of
righteousness form Luther’s view of reality and his anthropology respectively. He
understands reality as consisting of two realms—the realm of the Creator or the kingdom
of God, and the realm of creation or the kingdom of the world. He understands a person
as existing simultaneously in these two kingdoms. Thus, the two kingdoms can be rightly
labeled as the two realms of human existence.100 B.A. Gerrish rightly asserts,
Luther is thinking of the two kingdoms as two dimensions of existence. At one
and the same time, the Christian faces towards God in the Heavenly Kingdom,
and towards his [or her] neighbour in the Earthly Kingdom. He [or she] lives in
relation to God, and he [or she] lives in society with his [or her] fellows. To the
Heavenly Kingdom belong grace, faith, and spiritual righteousness; to the Earthly
Kingdom, law, works, and civil righteousness.101
Because a person exists simultaneously in the two realms, he or she must satisfy
at one and the same time the respective rules that govern them. In the heavenly realm
(coram Deo), he or she is justified by faith alone, without works. In the earthly realm
(coram mundo), he or she is justified by good works that benefit the well-being of the self
and the neighbor. Put differently, a person is made righteous passively coram Deo, and
actively coram mundo.
To be human, therefore, for Luther, includes being passive before God, simply
receiving God’s gracious act of justification through faith, and being active before the
world, lovingly caring for the well-being of the self and the neighbor through good
works. Robert Kolb and Charles P. Arand capture this well when they write that,
according to Luther, “what makes human beings genuine human creatures of God in his
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sight is his grace and favor alone, to which we respond with total trust in him; what
makes us genuinely human in relationship to other creatures is our performance of the
works of love, which God designed to be our way of living our trust in him.”102 Kolb and
Arand rightly call the two kinds of righteousness “Luther’s anthropological
presupposition.”103
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CHAPTER THREE
THE TWO KINDS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
FRAMEWORK
The previous chapter explored the nature and dynamics of Luther’s doctrine of
the two kinds of righteousness and remarked that this doctrine is interconnected with his
doctrine of the two kingdoms. A person exists simultaneously in the kingdom of God and
in the kingdom of the world. In his or her life in the kingdom of God, he or she is made
righteous passively. But in his or her life in the kingdom of the world, he or she actively
works his or her righteousness through good works.
The chapter concluded that the two doctrines—the doctrine of the two kingdoms
and that of the two kinds of righteousness—form Luther’s view of reality and his
anthropology respectively. I shall argue further in the present chapter that the doctrine of
the two kinds of righteousness can also be utilized as an interdisciplinary framework that
determines the terms of the relationship between theology and other fields of inquiry.
An Interdisciplinary Framework
In his exposition of Psalm 51, Luther writes, “The proper subject of theology is
[hu]man guilty of sin and condemned, and God the Justifier and Savior of [hu]man the
sinner.”1 Bayer formulates this statement succinctly as follows: “the subject—the
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subiectum—of theology [is] ‘the sinning human being and the justifying God’” 2 (homo
peccator et Deus iustficans). Bayer explains,
It is not by chance that Luther’s answer to the question about the subject of
theology is articulated in his interpretation of Psalm 51, which tradition has
counted among the penitential psalms; it has particular importance for the history
of Luther’s theology. The wording of the psalm forces one to speak of sin and
grace. . . . To speak theologically of sin and grace means to speak of God’s
promissio and of his lex, about the law that accuses as well as kills and about the
gospel that comforts as well as makes alive.3
Bayer then argues that if to speak of the sinning human being and the justifying
God means to speak of sin and grace, and of law and gospel, then it means to speak of the
Word. “God and humans coexist in the Word,” he writes, “in the Word of the confession
of sins and in the Word of the forgiveness of sins.”4 As noted in the previous chapter,
God bestows the righteousness of Christ or passive righteousness upon us through the
Word. That is, to speak of the Word means to speak of the gift of justification by grace.
One therefore can infer from Luther’s statement that the subject matter of theology is
justification or the righteousness of Christ. Indeed, theology, as Forde compellingly
argues, is for the proclamation of this kind of righteousness.5 In other words, theology is
intertwined with passive righteousness.
Moreover, as previously explained, active righteousness, for Luther, is where
reason plays an important role. It is true that Luther sometimes referred to reason as “a
big red murderess, the devil’s bride, a damned whore, a blind guide, the enemy of faith,

2

Bayer, Martin Luther's Theology, 37. Emphases in the original.

3

Ibid., 38. Italics in the original.

4

Ibid., 39.

5

Gerhard O. Forde, Theology Is for Proclamation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990).

50
the greatest and most invincible enemy of God”6 or, more famously, as “the devil’s
whore.”7 However, he does so only when reason is used as a way to know God and
thereby to achieve righteousness coram Deo, which, he insists throughout his works and
life as a Reformer, is received only through faith. But when reason is used properly, that
is, in the realm of life coram mundo, he agrees that reason can be “God’s greatest and
most important gift to [hu]man[ity], of inestimable beauty and excellence, a glorious
light, a most useful servant in theology, something divine.”8
In the words of Gerrish, “Luther is not simply ‘against’ law and reason, he is
against an unwarranted transferring of them from their proper place, which is (with
qualifications) the Earthly Kingdom, to the Heavenly Kingdom, where they generally
lead only to the agonies of a tormented conscience. It is precisely the work of the Devil to
‘mix the Kingdoms’ in this way.”9 Therefore, Gerrish concludes, “Luther’s attitude
towards reason is seen to rest upon a fundamental dualism between the Kingdom of
Christ (regnum Christi) and the Kingdom of the World (regnum mundi). Reason is
properly exercised within the limits of the regnum mundi, and must not presume to
trespass upon the regnum Christi.”10
For Luther, Gerrish summarizes, reason, in the realm of life coram mundo,
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is able to do many things: it can judge in human and worldly matters, it can build
cities and houses, it can govern well. The world knows how to build, how to keep
house, how to manage estate and servants, how to be outwardly pious and to lead
a decent, honest life. . . . Reason is able to found kingdoms and commonwealths,
to fence them in and make them firm with useful laws, to direct and govern them
with good counsel and sound precepts, to prescribe many things indispensable for
the preservation of commonwealths and human society (societatis humanae—
virtually, “civilization”).11
Luther associated reason with philosophy and sciences.12 Therefore, one can
claim that active righteousness is associated with other fields than theology. In sum, the
two kinds of righteousness can be associated with theology and other forms of human
knowledge. And because the two kinds of righteousness, as I shall demonstrate below,
are related to each other in specific ways, theology and other fields also are.
The two kinds of righteousness are inseparable. As already mentioned, Luther
placed the two kinds of righteousness into the two kingdoms. He writes, “We set forth
two worlds, as it were, one of them heavenly and the other earthly. Into these we place
these two kinds of righteousness.”13 Gerhard Ebeling notes that “the two kingdoms are
related to one another and belong to one another, in that God is Lord in both. For ‘the
secular rule can also be called the kingdom of God.’”14 And he continues,
To exist before God and to exist before the world are not two possible and
mutually exclusive choices, two separate realities, but an alternate relationship
which is necessarily simultaneous. Someone who possesses his [or her] existence
in the sight of God does not thereby cease to exist in the sight of the world. And
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someone who possesses his existence in the sight of the world is not thereby
deprived of his existence in the sight of God.15
Moreover, the two kingdoms are governed by two governments. And Luther
insists that these two governments “must be permitted to remain; the one to produce
[passive] righteousness, the other to bring about external peace and prevent evil deeds.
Neither one is sufficient in the world without the other.”16 Luther here implies that the
two kinds of righteousness which the two governments produce are not “alternatives to
one another as if we could be fully human by possessing only one kind of righteousness,
either the passive or the active.”17 Indeed, he insists that “we must be righteous before
God and [human].”18 Hence, “The two kinds of righteousness,” Kolb and Arand remark,
“are inseparable from one another. The passive righteousness of faith provides the core
identity of a person; the active righteousness of love flows from that core identity out into
the world.”19
However, the two kinds of righteousness are distinct. Luther claims in the preface
to his 1535 Galatians commentary that his theology consists of the clear distinction
between the two kinds of righteousness. “This is our theology,” he writes, “by which we
teach a precise distinction between th[e] two kinds of righteousness, the active and the
passive, so that morality and faith, works and grace, secular society and religion may not
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be confused. Both are necessary, but both must be kept within their limits.”20 His main
goal in writing the commentary is to admonish both clergy and laity to diligently learn
the art of distinguishing between the two kinds of righteousness, because they “may not
be confused.”21
Passive righteousness is received through faith, whereas active righteousness is
achieved through good works. Also, passive righteousness is wholly and perfect, while
active righteousness is partial. As Gerrish notes, “[I]n the Earthly Kingdom there is the
possibility of improvement, daily growth in the righteousness of love; whereas in the
Heavenly Kingdom the Christian is already wholly righteous, because the righteousness
of faith is the perfect righteousness of Christ. Justification before God is instantaneous
and complete.”22 Indeed, Luther writes that passive righteousness “is an infinite
righteousness, and one that swallows up all sins in a moment, for it is impossible that sin
should exist in Christ.”23 Furthermore, passive righteousness defines our core identity as
it secures our core being before and in God. In other words, passive righteousness is
ultimate as it is eternal. Active righteousness, on the contrary, is penultimate. It is
temporal as it is related to the temporal realm—the world or the realm of creation.
The two kinds of righteousness, therefore, must be distinguished from each other.
“Maintaining the distinction between the two,” Kolb and Arand write, “allows us to
affirm both dimensions of our humanity. The passive righteousness of faith brings about
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our salvation by restoring our relationship with God. The active righteousness of works
serves the well-being of creation by looking after our neighbor.”24
Lastly, the two kinds of righteousness are in asymmetrical order. Passive
righteousness has conceptual priority over the active. For Luther, active righteousness is
the fruit or the consequence of passive righteousness.25 That is, passive righteousness is
the basis for active righteousness. A person has to be justified by the righteousness of
faith first before his or her works become good and righteous.26 In fact, Luther maintains
that the doctrine of justification is the doctrine upon which the church stands or falls; if
this doctrine is lost, then the whole of Christian doctrine is lost.
In conclusion, the two kinds of righteousness are inseparable, distinct, and
asymmetrical in order, with passive righteousness having priority over the active. These
conditions of the relationship between the two kinds of righteousness also determine the
conditions of the relationship between theology and other fields. Theology and other
fields are inseparable, distinct, and asymmetrical in order, with logical priority assigned
to theology. These conditions of the relationship between theology and other forms of
human knowledge function in parallel with the conditions of the relationship between
theology and other forms of human knowledge proposed by Loder and Hunsinger in the
Chalcedonian model of interdisciplinarity.
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The Chalcedonian Model
In his book Practical Theology: An Introduction, Osmer identifies three models of
interdisciplinary approach that theologians have developed. The first model he identifies
is the correlational model, which comprises Paul Tillich’s “method of correlation”27 and
all the subsequent diversities that different theologians have developed based on this
method, such as the “revised correlational method” by David Tracy and Don Browning,28
and the “revised praxis method of correlation” by Matthew Lamb and Rebecca Chopp.29
The second model is the transformational model, which includes the “ad hoc
correlational method” of Hans Frei30 and the “Chalcedonian model” developed by Loder
and Hunsinger.31 The third model Osmer identifies is the transversal model developed by
J. Wentzel van Huyssteen.32
I will focus solely on the second type of the transformational model—the
Chalcedonian model. This model is built upon the Chalcedonian pattern which is made
up of the Christological formulations issued by the ecumenical council of Chalcedon
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(A.D. 451) which declared that the two natures of Christ, his divinity and humanity, are
“without confusion or change” and yet also “without division or separation.”33 It was
expanded by Karl Barth later on, as Hunsinger writes: “According to Barth’s
interpretation of Chalcedon, Jesus’ divine and human natures, each present in a complete
or unabridged way, were to be understood not only as related without separation or
division and without confusion or change but also with conceptual priority assigned to
the divine over the human nature.”34
As a result, the Chalcedonian pattern consists of the following three features that
characterize the relationship between the divinity and humanity of Christ: without
confusion or change (indissoluble differentiation), without separation or division
(inseparable unity), and with an asymmetrical ordering (indestructible order).35 Both
Loder and Hunsinger have creatively, but somewhat differently, transposed this pattern as
an interdisciplinary model.
Concerning Loder’s use of the Chalcedonian pattern as an interdisciplinary
framework, Osmer provides a succinct summary of it as he writes:
Loder argues that the three rules of [the Chalcedonian pattern] can guide
theology’s dialogue with other fields. First, the knowledge given to faith is unique
and not to be confused with other forms of human knowledge. Theology, thus,
must be differentiated from the arts and sciences. Second, theology cannot carry
out its work without entering into a dialogue with other forms of human
knowledge; they are inseparably joined in a bipolar unity. Third, the relationship
between theology and other fields follows an asymmetrical order, with theology
retaining “marginal control” over the knowledge of other fields when they are
brought into its own forms of discourse. In short, theology listens to and learns
33
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from other fields. But it transforms their insights according to the rules of its own
theological grammar.36
What Osmer does not mention about Loder’s use of the Chalcedonian pattern as
an interdisciplinary framework is that Loder assigns logical and ontological priority to
theology.37 Besides, Loder also analogously utilizes the Chalcedonian pattern as a norm
to describe the nature of epistemology, reality, and human development. First, noting that
the Chalcedonian pattern was “carefully constructed to communicate accurately a nonobjectifiable reality as objectively as possible,”38 Loder argues that this pattern,
especially when used analogously to the logic of complementarity in Niels Bohr’s
quantum physics, allows faith and reason to complement each other. This means, he
explains, that the Chalcedonian pattern endorses what he calls “the epistemology of
complementarity,” which is an epistemology that “keep[s] faith with reason and at the
same time complete[s] the knowing act as inclusive of faith.”39
Second, Loder contends that the complementarity between the two natures of
Christ or “the God-man frame of reference,” as he calls it, analogously define reality as
the complementarity between eternity and human existence.40 Drawing upon Søren
Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the Chalcedonian pattern, he claims that “‘eternity’ and
human ‘existence’ are always both antithetical and inseparable.”41 Third, Loder uses “the
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God-man” framework to describe analogously the nature of human development as
involving the complementarity between the Divine Spirit and the human spirit. The
Divine Spirit and the human spirit, for Loder, are without confusion or change, without
separation or division, and with the Divine Spirit having logical and ontological priority
over the human spirit, for he notes that the third characteristic of the Chalcedonian
pattern “refers to the asymmetry that pertains between the divine and the human in
Christ, with the divine exercising logical and ontological priority over human.”42
Loder, in his use of the Chalcedonian pattern, works primarily in the normative
move of the practical theological interpretation.43 Drawing upon Bohr’s quantum physics
and Kierkegaard, he utilizes the Chalcedonian pattern as a norm to define epistemology
and reality. Drawing upon Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, and Erik Erikson, just to name a
few, he makes use of it as a norm to describe human development. And drawing upon
Barth, whom he interprets through T.F. Torrance, he develops it as a norm for practical
theology.
The two kinds of righteousness as an interdisciplinary framework can also be
utilized as a norm for reality, personhood, epistemology, and pastoral theology. I have
already made the point that the two kinds of righteousness in Luther are interconnected
with the two kingdoms or the two realms of human existence. One cannot talk about the
former without the latter. The doctrine of the two kingdoms is Luther’s view of reality,
while the doctrine of the two kinds of righteousness is his view of personhood or his
anthropology.
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Moreover, the framework of the two kinds of righteousness makes faith and
reason epistemologically complete each other. Passive righteousness is a subject of faith,
whereas active righteousness is a subject of reason. As the two kinds of righteousness,
though distinct and asymmetrical in order, are inseparable, faith and reason also are. And
because faith and reason are inseparable, but complementing each other, pastoral
theology, in order to faithfully fulfill its vocation, needs to enter into conversation with
other fields.
Hunsinger uses the Chalcedonian pattern to interpret the nature of the relationship
between theology and other disciplines, specifically between theology and psychology in
the church ministry of pastoral counseling. For her, this ministry of the church is
fundamentally interdisciplinary. “Becoming equipped for [it],” she writes, “requires both
psychological and theological training.”44 Hence, she contends that
pastoral counselors must learn to become “bilingual.” They must learn to be as
skilled in the language or symbol system of theology as they are in that of
psychology. They must be equipped to interpret and experience themselves and
their world in theological as well as in psychological terms. They must become
linguistically competent in the one discipline as in the other, interiorizing by
practice and training two very different sets of skills. They must learn how to feel,
act, and think in conformity with two different modes of thought.45
She defines the bilingual competencies of the pastoral counselor by the
stipulations of the Chalcedonian pattern. That is, the two languages, for her, must be
without separation or division, yet without confusion or change; and theology has logical
precedence over psychology. Theology is assigned logical priority because it “essentially
pertains not only to creaturely realities but also to the reality of God . . . psychology by
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definition pertains only to a creaturely level of reality.”46 Thus, “psychological concepts
could not possibly exist on the same level as theological concepts.”47
Unlike Loder, who assigns ontological priority to theology, however, she assigns
only conceptual or logical precedence to theology. Theresa F. Latini highlights
Hunsinger’s position as follows:
Asymmetry does not mean that theology has ontological superiority over other
disciplines. Theology is a human, finite, and frequently flawed endeavor. At its
best, it witnesses to Jesus Christ, the Word and work of God. Like other
ecclesiastical practices, it exists in one of the outer spheres that potentially point
to Christ. As human reflection on and response to the Word and Spirit of God,
theology (or, more accurately, theologian) is put to death and resurrected, again
and again, by Jesus Christ.48
I would clarify this further and argue that what makes theology have logical or
conceptual, and not ontological, priority over other fields, is that, as noted above,
justification is the subject matter of theology. However, justification is not theology, nor
is theology justification. To frame it in the Chalcedonian language, justification and
theology are inseparable, yet they are distinct, with justification having logical and
ontological priority over theology. Justification is a divine act which defines our core
identity. It belongs to the eternal realm or life coram Deo and is objective. Theology, on
the other hand, is a method for interpreting this eternal and ultimate reality. It is a
subjective human endeavor and belongs to the temporal sphere or life coram mundo. In
fact, as a method for interpretation, it uses reason. It is science. Hence, it has no
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ontological priority over other scientific fields. It has logical priority, however, because
of the ontological nature of its subject matter.
So what is ontologically superior is not theology as a method, but its subject
matter, the gospel of justification, which is an objective reality that precedes any
discipline, even theology itself. “[J]ustification,” Mattes states, “serves as a discrimen” or
“the evaluator of all theology—including the standard of reason operative in theology.”49
“Hence,” he continues, “the doctrine of justification is the critical point that shapes other
doctrines and church practices. Our teachings need to conform to it, as well as our
pastoral practices.”50
Hunsinger notes, concerning the specification of asymmetry between theology
and psychology, “that what is at stake here are logical relationships that pertain to
concepts.”51 She explains, “We are speaking of theological and psychological concepts,
not directly of theological and psychological realities. In reality, there is no reason why
these factors may not all come together at one time.”52
In sum, theology and psychology, for Hunsinger,
represent material that cannot be integrated into a unified whole. They are
logically diverse; they have different aims, subject matters, methods, and
linguistic conventions. They do not exist on the same level. Both perspectives are
fully a part of the pastoral counselor, that is, they are integrated into the person,
but as language and thought worlds, they are not to be integrated with one another
in any systematic way.53
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Because she understands pastoral counseling as an interdisciplinary ministry that
requires the counselor to become fluent in two distinctively different languages, the
language of theology and that of psychology, she proposes that the practice of pastoral
counseling “would mean that one interprets the counselee’s material by employing two
logically diverse perspectives, the psychological and the theological.”54
While Hunsinger recommends theological and psychological interpretation of the
counselee’s material, I would like to propose, from the vantage point of the two kinds of
righteousness as an interdisciplinary framework, that pastoral theologians not only
interpret and describe pastoral care issues, such as shame, from both theological and
scientific perspectives, but also suggest strategies for its healing from both perspectives.
Stated otherwise, I recommend that pastoral theologians address shame from both
theological and scientific angles, not only at the interpretive and descriptive levels, but
also, and most importantly, at the pragmatic level.
As mentioned in the introduction, pastoral theologians tend to use exclusively
theological resources when it comes to the healing of shame. The framework of the two
kinds of righteousness, however, dictates that pastoral theologians not only interpret and
describe shame from both theological and scientific lenses, but also propose strategies for
its healing from both divine action (passive righteousness) and human action (active
righteousness).
Therefore, chapter four, the interpretive move of this work, will interpret shame in
an interdisciplinary way, that is, from both theological and social scientific viewpoints.
Chapter five, the descriptive-empirical move, will describe the personal, social, and
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theological aspects of the Malagasy shame. And chapters six and seven, the pragmatic
move, will discuss the healing of shame from social scientific and theological views
respectively.
But before we move on to the interpretation, description, and healing of shame
from an interdisciplinary perspective, it is important to warrant my choice for the two
kinds of righteousness, instead of the African understanding of personhood, as a
framework for pastoral theology in general, and for the interpretation, description, and
healing of shame in particular.
A Critique of the African Understanding of Personhood
As noted above, to be human, according to the framework of the two kinds of
righteousness, is to be simultaneously righteous coram Deo and coram mundo. This is a
holistic anthropology because a person is defined in relation to the two realms of human
existence—the eternal and the existential—which, according to Luther, form the
structures of reality. Though the framework of the two kinds of righteousness holistically
forms what it means to be human, it also points out that the two must be distinguished,
because they are without confusion or change. Indeed, what ultimately defines
personhood is righteousness coram Deo, or passive righteousness, because it is connected
to divine action that does for the creature, at the ontological level, what the creature
cannot do for itself. Therefore, though the two kinds of righteousness complement each
other to form personhood, the two must not be confused; and passive righteousness has
logical priority over active righteousness.
The African understanding of personhood is also holistic. In fact, Emmanuel E.
Lartey labels this understanding “relational holism” because it describes a person in
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relation to the community which, for Africans, encompasses the living and the dead, the
ancestors and the spirits, and the whole cosmos and God.55 The African view of
community, therefore, in the language of Bénézet Bujo, is anthropocentric, cosmic, and
theocentric.56 And personhood is defined in relation to such holistic view of community.
John S. Mbiti, one of the most prominent scholars of African religions and
philosophy, is worth quoting at length in his description of this African understanding of
personhood, despite the presence of strong masculine language therein. He writes:
In traditional life, the individual does not and cannot exist alone except
corporately. He owes his existence to other people, including those of past
generations and his contemporaries. He is simply part of the whole. The
community must therefore make, create or produce the individual; for the
individual depends on the corporate group. Physical birth is not enough: the child
must go through rites of incorporation so that it becomes fully integrated into the
entire society. These rites continue throughout the physical life of the person,
during which the individual passes from one stage of corporate existence to
another. The final stage is reached when he dies and even then he is ritually
incorporated into the wide family of both the dead and the living.
Just as God made the first man, as God’s man, so now man himself makes the
individual who becomes the corporate or social man. It is a deeply religious
transaction. Only in terms of other people does the individual become conscious
of his own being, his own duties, his privileges and responsibilities towards
himself and towards other people. When he suffers, he does not suffer alone but
with the corporate group; when he rejoices, he rejoices not alone but with his
kinsmen, his neighbours and his relatives whether dead or living. When he gets
married, he is not alone, neither does the wife “belong” to him alone. So also the
children belong to the corporate body of kinsmen, even if they bear only their
father’s or mother’s name. Whatever happens to the individual happens to the
whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual.
The individual can only say: “I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I
am.” This is a cardinal point in the understanding of the African view of man.57
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Because of the primacy of community in the African understanding of
personhood, scholars of African religions and philosophy have critiqued this
understanding as condescending to the rights of the individuals. Some other scholars,
however, have responded to this objection and even provided more persuasive
explanations. Kwame Gyekye, for instance, argues that African communitarianism is
moderate and not radical.58 He explains that African communal life seeks the well-being
of both the community as a whole in general and of the individual as a person in
particular.59 Bujo, confirming Gyekye’s point, observes that the African “principle of
solidarity does not in the least mean that the individual loses his [or her] identity in and
because of the group. . . . For example, individuality in Africa is emphasized by the fact
that each one has his [or her] own name, which is different from that of his [or her]
parents.”60
What is problematic in the African understanding of personhood, therefore, is not
the condescension of the rights of the individuals to the values of the whole group, but
rather, the reversal of the proper ordering of the two kinds of righteousness, by making
righteousness coram mundo the ultimate basis for defining personhood. As already
shown in the previous chapter, in his treatise The Freedom of a Christian, Luther
associates righteousness coram Deo with the inner person and righteousness coram
mundo with the outer person. He states that coram Deo, a person “is perfectly free lord of
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all, subject to none.” That is, no external thing a person does has any influence or
contribution to his or her personhood. Rather, personhood is ultimately determined and
secured by what God does for a person through Christ. Hence, though coram mundo, a
person, “is perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all,” by performing good works that
serve the neighbor, his or her good works do not make him or her a good person. He or
she does good works because he or she is a good person. In other words, for Luther, the
inner person is always primary, whereas the outer always secondary.
Theo Sundermeier, in his book The Individual and Community in African
Traditional Religions, makes an interesting remark that, for Africans, it is the other way
around, i.e., the external takes priority over the internal. He writes,
The external is decisive, the real thing, because everything to do with people and
their earthly life has its place here, in this world. Body and soul cannot be
separated, and so perception proceeds from the external to the internal. If Goethe
captured the traditional Western experience of reality in the couplet: “Denn das is
der Natur Gehalt, dass aussen gilt, was innen galt,” then it should be reversed for
Africa: the content of nature is that the inside is determined by the outside. 61
He continues,
The following anecdote will illustrate this point. Once we were reading Luther’s
“Of the freedom of a Christian” in a theological seminar. The African students
spontaneously and violently opposed Luther’s claim that appearances and
outward signs are not important. Even Jesus’ saying that it is what comes out a
person that makes him or her unclean, and not what goes in (Mark 7: 15, 20), was
not understood as a devaluation of outward signs.62
In fact, personhood, for Africans, is not inherent. It is gained. One gains it through
specific rites of passage or initiation. In the Antemoro tribe of Madagascar, to which my
mother belongs, for instance, a baby boy has to be circumcised before he is considered a
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human being. Likewise, a baby girl has to be ear-pierced before she is considered a
person. An uncircumcised boy, or a girl who is not ear-pierced, when dead, cannot be
mourned either by the parents or the community at large; nor can he or she be buried in
the communal tomb.
To be buried in the communal tomb means that a person belonged to the
community of the living when he or she was alive, and now he or she belongs to the
community of the ancestors. Remember that community, for Africans, encompasses the
living, the dead, the whole cosmos, and God. To be buried outside the communal tomb,
therefore, means that a person is excommunicated. That is, he or she lost his or her
personhood, for personhood is defined by connection to the community.
Moreover, the African notion of personhood not only reverses the order of the two
kinds of righteousness, but also induces shame easily. In his description of the Akamba
initiation rites, Mbiti notes, “Without being initiated, a person is not a full member of the
Akamba people. Furthermore, no matter how old or big he [or she] is, so long as he [or
she] is not initiated, he [or she] is despised and considered to be still a boy or girl.”63 Not
being initiated becomes a stigma. And stigma is a big shame factor. 64
Or consider the following description by Mbiti,
In some African societies, marriage is not fully recognized or consummated until
the wife has given birth. First, pregnancy becomes, therefore, the final seal of
marriage, the sign of complete integration of the woman into her husband’s
family and kinship circle. Unhappy is the woman who fails to get children for,
whatever other qualities she might possess, her failure to bear children is worse
than committing genocide: she has become the dead end of human life, not only
for the genealogical line but also for herself. When she dies, there will be nobody
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of her own immediate blood to “remember” her, to keep her in the state of
personal immortality: she will simply be “forgotten.” Her husband may remedy
the situation a bit, by raising children with another wife; but the childless wife
bears a scar which nothing can erase. She will suffer for this, her own relatives
will suffer for this; and it will be an irreparable humiliation for which there is no
source for comfort in traditional life.65
Therefore, though I am an African, and my work aims to suggest faithful and
effective pastoral care practice in relation to the problem and pain of shame in the
Malagasy context, I chose to use the two kinds of righteousness, instead of the African
understanding of personhood, as a framework for interpreting, describing, and healing
shame. Using the two kinds of righteousness as a framework is more promising to the
healing of shame than using the African notion of personhood.
It is to be noted, however, that the African understanding of community is
convenient for framing the scope of active righteousness in that it is more holistic than
the Lutheran conception of active righteousness. For Luther, good works serve the wellbeing of the self and the neighbor. For Africans, the community which good works
should serve is the whole cosmos. Therefore, one can formulate active righteousness,
from an African perspective, as good works that serve the self, other, and God’s entire
creation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SHAME: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTERPRETATION
Chapter three developed Luther’s doctrine of the two kinds of righteousness as an
interdisciplinary framework and proposed that pastoral theologians and pastoral
caregivers should describe and interpret shame as well as suggest strategies for its healing
from an interdisciplinary perspective, drawing upon both theology and other disciplines.
The present chapter, the interpretive task of this work, shall therefore interpret shame
from both social-scientific and theological perspectives.
According to Osmer, the interpretive task of practical theology draws upon
theories of the arts and sciences in order to explain and understand why patterns and
dynamics of a particular episode, situation, or context are going on. As already
mentioned, theology, as a method for interpretation, belongs to sciences. Interpreting
shame theologically is therefore appropriate for the interpretive task.1 Thus, this chapter
is divided into two sections. Section one provides a social-scientific interpretation of
shame, while section two a theological interpretation.
A Social-scientific Interpretation of Shame
In his book Shame, Exposure, and Privacy, Carl D. Schneider helpfully
distinguishes between two types of shame. One is discretion, “a sense of shame” before a
1
I veer from Osmer at this point. According to Osmer, theological interpretation is one way of
carrying out the normative task, not the interpretive task.
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given act or circumstance. This type of shame, Schneider writes, “not only reflects, but
sustains, our personal and social ordering of the world.”2 The other is disgrace, a feeling
of shame after the act or circumstance. According to Schneider, this type of shame is the
painful experience of “being ashamed.”3
In his book Shame: The Power of Caring,4 Gershen Kaufman persuasively argues
that shame in its disgrace form can be internalized and become a personality trait. This
section, therefore, is divided into three sub-sections. Sub-section one briefly describes the
nature and functions of discretion shame, whereas sub-sections two and three delve into
the exploration of the nature, origins, and effects of disgrace shame and internalized
shame, respectively.
Discretion Shame
As enunciated above, this type of shame, according to Schneider, is the sense of
shame that protects the personal and social ordering of the world. It safeguards us from
the potential violation entailed in the public display of our intrinsically private
experiences, such as sex and love, eating and elimination, and pain and death.5 These
fundamental human experiences, Schneider argues, are emotionally vulnerable and need
to be protected from the obscenity of inappropriate exposure in order for the personal and
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social ordering of life to be sustained.6 He believes that “the individual is left open to
violation when the restraining claims of shame are dismissed.”7
Francis Broucek, drawing from the work of Schneider, describes discretion shame
as “anticipatory shame, that is, the discretionary function that makes us pause before
saying or doing something that would arouse the painful feeling of shame in ourselves or
another.”8 For Broucek, discretion shame is “vital to our individual and collective
emotional, moral, and spiritual welfare.”9 Léon Wurmser, though he does not use the
term “discretion shame,” identifies the same type of shame and calls it “preventive
shame.” In his article “Nietzsche’s War against Shame and Resentment,” he describes
preventive shame as “an overall character trait preventing disgraceful exposure. It is an
attitude of respect toward others and toward oneself.”10
In short, discretion shame has two roles. First, it functions as the custodian of
personal worthiness. That is, it acts as the guardian of self-respect. Second, it protects the
dignity of others. It functions as moral shame. Discretion shame is therefore the guardian
angel of our humanness. The opposite of discretion shame is shamelessness, as Schneider
writes, “The concept of shamelessness suggests that the lack of a proper sense of shame
is a moral deficiency and that the possession of a sense of shame is a moral obligation.”11
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Thus, he concludes, “I have drawn attention to shame, not to dismiss it as a mechanism
that is crippling or inhibiting, but rather to suggest that a sensitivity to the sense of shame
will result in a richer understanding of what it means to be fully human.”12
Disgrace Shame
While discretion shame is humanizing, disgrace shame is disintegrative. As stated
above, disgrace shame is the felt experience of being ashamed.13 Schneider observes that
“[b]eing ashamed is an affect.”14 Silvan Tomkins, the pioneer of what is known as
“affects theory,” identifies nine affects, which he classifies into two groups—positive and
negative. There are three positive affects: interest or excitement, enjoyment or joy, and
surprise or startle. And there are six negative ones: distress or anguish, fear or terror,
shame or humiliation, dissmell, disgust, and anger or rage. Shame affect, according to
Tomkins, is the physiological interruption of interest or excitement.15 Donald L.
Nathanson, an interpreter of Tomkins, writes, “Shame affect operates to reduce interestexcitement and enjoyment-joy, the affects that make us vital, lively, charming, fun,
interesting, enjoyable, exciting, charismatic, thrilling, inspiring, and appealing. If you
wonder why someone lacks vitality, look first for nearness to shame.”16
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Disgrace shame, in the words of Schneider, “is a painful experience of the
disintegration of one’s world. A break occurs in the self’s relationship with itself and/or
others. An awkward, uncomfortable space opens up in the world. The self is no longer
whole, but divided. It feels less than it wants to be, less than at its best it knows itself to
be.”17 The experience is so painful, Brown notes, that “when we try to describe it, when
we try to make it accessible for other people to understand, we struggle to find the words.
Even when we find the words, it is rare that people will want to listen.”18
Shame is hard to communicate because, as Tomkins points out in his introduction
to Gershen Kaufman’s book Shame: The Power of Caring, “there is shame about shame.
It is much easier to admit one is happy or sad than one feels ashamed.”19 We do not want
to listen to an experience of shame because listening to it can be almost as painful as the
actual experience. Shame is painful emotionally, physically, and mentally, as John
Everingham writes,
Here are some of the keys now known for shame: emotional keys include feeling
like shrinking, feeling frozen, a sinking feeling, an intense desire to hide, intense
emotional discomfort for no apparent reason, feeling like being on the hot seat, or
imagining all eyes are on you, and anxious self-surveillance.
The physical keys are eyes averted, head down, face flushed, ears burning,
involuntary shudders, or throat and chest tight, speech halting or without
resonance and power, and gut rigid or churning.
The mental and cognitive keys involve being inarticulate . . . the panicky
awareness of a mind gone blank.20
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This holistically painful experience, at its core, is a feeling of unworthiness and
diminishment. Brown writes, “Shame is the intensely painful feeling or experience of
believing we are flawed and therefore unworthy of acceptance and belonging.”21 Paul
Gilbert asserts, “Shame is about being in the world as an undesirable self, a self one does
not wish to be. [It] is . . . an awareness that one has lost status and is devalued.”22 In fact,
shame calls into question not only the self’s value, but also the meaning of interpersonal
relationships, and the meaning of existence itself.23 Thus, shame strikes deepest into
one’s psyche. To use Kaufman’s words, it is “a sickness within the self, a disease of the
spirit, however brief or lasting.”24
Moreover, fear, namely fear of rejection and disconnection, is embedded in shame
experience. “The underling dynamic of disgrace shame,” Schneider writes, “is the fear of
rejection.”25 Brown concurs and states, “Shame is all about fear. . . . [It] is about the fear
of disconnection. When we are experiencing shame, we are steeped in the fear of being
ridiculed, diminished or seen as flawed. We are afraid that we’ve exposed or revealed a
part of us that jeopardize our connection and our worthiness of acceptance.”26
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According to Schneider, disgrace shame and discretion shame are intimately
linked to exposure.27 Disgrace shame, in particular, “is about exposure of some
discrediting fact or quality. It is exposure of something that ought not to show because it
is discrediting, potentially harmful . . . and capable of fracturing a relationship.”28
Kaufman, stating that “[e]xposure is an important characteristic of shame and is,
therefore, central to understanding its dynamic impact,” notes that the “exposure can be
either to others or to the self alone.”29
The sense of exposure that can generate shame is made possible by what Broucek
calls “objective self-awareness,” which is “an awareness of oneself as an object for others
and, through the mirroring of the observing others, taking oneself as an object of
reflection (objectifying oneself).”30 Objective self-awareness, on one hand, creates selfimage, the status the self believes it holds at the moment. On the other hand, it creates
self-ideal, which is what the self wants to become. Self-ideal is created by the self in
relation to the ideal of the community or group to which it belongs.31 Shame ensues when
the self realizes that it fails to measure up to its ideal.32
The realization may come through an exposure to the self, a type of exposure that
does not require the presence of other. It happens when the eye of the self gazes inward
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and sees that there is deficiency between the self and its ideal.33 It may also happen when
a person involuntarily remembers previous traumatic shameful event or experience.34
Exposure to the self can take place as long as the attributions that give rise to it occur.
The self may realize its failure to measure up to the ideal-self also through an
exposure to other, namely an evaluative other who subjects the self to shaming
evaluation(s).35 The intensity of this type of exposure, however, does not depend on how
shaming the other’s evaluation of the self is, but rather, on how the self evaluates itself
through the evaluation of the other. Kaufman writes that “[i]t is not so much that others
are, in fact, watching us. Rather, it is we who are watching ourselves, and because we are,
it seems most especially that the watching eyes belong to others.”36 Jean-Paul Sartre puts
it as follows:
To “feel oneself blushing,” to “feel oneself sweating,” etc., are inaccurate
expressions which the shy person uses to describe his state; what he really means
is that he is vividly and constantly conscious of his body not as it is for him but as
it is for the Other. . . . We often say that the shy man is “embarrassed by his own
body.” Actually this expression is incorrect; I cannot be embarrassed by my own
body as I exist it. It is my body as it is for the Other which may embarrass me.37
Since shame is holistically painful, to survive it, a person naturally develops
defense mechanisms against it. Nathanson identifies four poles of shame defense
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reactions, which he calls “the compass of shame.” They are withdrawal, attack self,
avoidance, and attack other.38 Withdrawal is associated with hiding, which involves
gestures such as putting hands to lips, placing hand to forehead, or covering the eyes with
hands. Attack self is associated with blaming the self as deserving the shame it is
experiencing, for example, when someone comes up to me after Sunday morning worship
and says, “You are a bad preacher!” Such a criticism would normally trigger a feeling of
shame in me! If I am in the attack self mood, I would accept the person’s judgment and
agree that I indeed am a bad preacher.
Avoiding is associated with using alcohol, drugs, among others, to alleviate the
pain of shame. For example, in response to “You are a bad preacher,” I would spend the
rest of my Sunday afternoon watching movies on Netflix, trying to divert the feeling of
shame I might experience. Attack other is associated with shaming the other who caused
the shame experience on the self. I would express rage to the person who says “You are a
bad preacher,” and blame him or her, saying, “I’m not a bad preacher. I spend so much
time to prepare for my sermons. You are the bad listener! You didn’t understand how
good that sermon was!”
Brown, using Linda Hartling’s three categories of shame defenses, gives a
succinct summary of shame defense mechanisms as follows:
According to Dr. Hartling, in order to deal with shame, some of us move away by
withdrawing, hiding, silencing ourselves, and keeping secrets. Some of us move
toward by seeking to appease and please. And some of us move against by trying
to gain power over others, by being aggressive, and by using shame to fight
Nathanson, Shame and Pride, 305-77. See also Donald L. Nathanson, “Shame and the Affect
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shame . . . .Most of us use all of these—at different times with different folks for
different reasons.39
Furthermore, since shame is holistically painful, some scholars deem it to be
completely negative. Brown insists that “there is nothing positive about shame. In any
form, in any context, and through any delivery system, shame is destructive.”40 June
Price Tangney and Ronda L. Dearing argue that a feeling of shame makes a person less
able to empathize, more likely to blame others, and more prone to a resentful kind of
anger. It is the feeling of guilt which can make a person better able to empathize, accept
responsibility, and express anger in a fairly direct and more constructive manner.41
It is important to note that shame is different from guilt. The difference between
the two, according to Brown,
is best understood as the differences between “I am bad” (shame) and “I did
something bad” (guilt). Shame is about who we are and guilt is about our
behaviors. If I feel guilty for cheating on a test, my self-talk might sound
something like “I should not have done that. That was really stupid. Cheating is
not something I believe in or want to do.” If I feel shame about cheating on a test,
my self-talk is more likely to sound like “I’m a liar and a cheat. I’m so stupid. I’m
a bad person.”42
In sum, disgrace shame or the felt experience of being ashamed is the painful
feeling of unworthiness, accompanied by an intense fear of disconnection and rejection. It
is a painful experience which ensues as a result of exposure to the self or other, or both. It
is a feeling of disintegration both interpersonally and intrapersonally. In the language of
39
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Kaufman, “shame is both alienating and isolating.”43 Disgrace shame may be internalized
and become a personality trait.
Internalized Shame
Internalized shame is the result of the process Kaufman calls “shame
internalization,” which “refers to the process by which shame comes to lie at the very
core of the self, and hence one’s identity.”44 A shame-based identity entails constant
feelings of inferiority, defectiveness, unwantedness, unworthiness, or isolation. “Those
who have a shame-based-identity,” Albers writes, “believe in their heart of hearts that in
essence they are of no account, unacceptable, and unlovable.”45 Moreover, a shame-based
identity includes chronic fear of disconnection, alienation, isolation, or rejection. A
person with a shame-based identity is more likely to think and to say, in the words of
Everingham, “There’s something wrong with me. I’m so defective that I don’t belong
here. If I can hide my defectiveness, may be they won’t notice and let me stay. So far I’ve
managed to fool them, but I live in constant fear of being exposed as a fraud and sent
away—to die.”46
According to Kaufman, there are three aspects of internalization:
(1) We internalize specific affect-beliefs or attitudes about ourselves which come
to lie at the very core of the self and thereby help to mold our emerging sense of
identity. (2) We also internalize the very ways in which we are treated by
significant others and we learn to treat ourselves accordingly. . . . (3) And we
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internalize identification in the form of images—we take them inside us and make
them our own.47
Internalization is a natural outcome of identification, which “is an inevitable
occurrence in human affairs, universally experienced, and life-long.”48 We identify with
our parents, our siblings, or our grandparents. We also identify with our teachers,
mentors, or any significant other who is most vital for our survival.49 We identify with
the significant others whether they treat us with respect or contempt. Kaufman notes,
“Identification based on love and respect, that is, experiencing a significant other who
primarily treats us in these ways, will enable us to learn to treat ourselves tenderly,
lovingly and with respect for our own imperfect humanness.”50
Identification with shaming and contemptuous significant others will lead to
shame internalization, and thus to shame-based identity. Hunsinger writes, “When those
around us have attitude of devaluation or contempt toward us, when they treat us in a
blaming fashion, and when we internalize the image and voice of the shaming parent,
then we become subject to a shame-based identity.”51
There are three contributing sources of shame internalization, according to
Kaufman. They are affect-shame binds, drive-shame binds, and need shame-binds.52
Drawing on Tomkins’ affects theory, Kaufman argues that particular affects can be
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bound with shame when the expression of any affect is followed by a shaming reaction.
For instance, if a child is consistently ridiculed for expressing anger, he or she will
become ashamed of being angry. Every time the child feels anger, he or she will also feel
shame. The two affects—anger and shame—are therefore bound together. A drive-shame
bind might arise when a child learns from the significant others that his or her sexuality is
disgusting or bad in some way. The child may become prone to feeling shame about his
or her sexuality.
A need-shame bind may occur when a child’s need is consistently denied and
unmet by significant others. Kaufman identifies six fundamental needs which, when
denied, might lead to need-shame binds. One is the need for relationship, the most
fundamental need of all. It is the need for close interpersonal relationship with others,
who want to be in relationship with you. The second need is the need for touching and
holding. This need provides a primary basis for the development of security ad trust. The
third need is the need for identification, the need to know others “from the inside” and to
gain a sense of belonging. The fourth need is the need for differentiation, an experience
of oneself as a separate being and capable of mastering developmental tasks. The fifth
need is the need to nurture. One needs to feel that the love and care one has to give is
good and valued by others. And the sixth need is the need for affirmation, which is the
need to feel worthwhile and valued for one’s uniqueness. When shame is bound with a
particular need, that need might be repressed altogether and any awareness of it is
completely absent.53
For the above descriptions of Kaufman’s three sources of shame internalization—affect-shame
binds, drive-shame binds, and need-shame binds—I am indebted to Hunsinger’s paraphrase of Kaufman.
See Hunsinger, Theology and Pastoral Counseling, 176.
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Shame internalization is a complex process. In addition to the three sources of
shame internalization described above, shame may also be internalized through family
systems, especially “those that protect [the family] history with secrets, mysteries, and
myths.”54 Family secrets may include bankruptcies, suicides, childhood deaths, or incest.
Family mysteries may entail unresolved grief or trauma. And family myths may involve
stories of success or heroism that needs to be preserved.55 Furthermore, shame may be
internalized through physical, sexual, verbal, or emotional abuse, especially when the
abuse is repeated and traumatic. Also, shame may be internalized through personal or
others’ stigma, specifically that of parents or siblings.56 The stigma may be disability,
weight, illness, or addiction to alcohol, drugs, sex, and food, among others.
Shame may be internalized through gender expectations. Brown writes, “Shame is
organized by gender. The expectations that fuel shame for women are based on our
culture’s perception of what is acceptable for women. In my new research on men, I’m
learning that the expectations that fuel shame for men are based on our culture’s
perception of masculinity—what should a man be, look like and act like.”57 Brown, of
course, refers to the North American culture where she conducted her research on shame.
However, gender expectations across cultures around the world undeniably fuel shame
internalization differently among men and women.
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Racism and colonization are also factors that may feed shame internalization. In
his book The Souls of Black Folk, published more than one hundred years ago (1903),
W.E.B. Du Bois describes the “Spiritual Striving” of the African Americans of that
period as follows:
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking
at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,—
an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two
waring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being
torn asunder.”58
The experience Du Bois describes in the quote above is shame in its internalized
state. Brown remarks that “shame is about perception. [It] is how we see ourselves
through other people’s eyes.”59 When shame is internalized, exposure in the eyes of
others becomes exposure of one’s inherent defectiveness as a human being. That is, to be
seen means to be seen as irreparably and unspeakably bad.60
The attitude of looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, i.e., internalized
shame, has also been the experience of the colonized Africans, according to Frantz Fanon
in his book Black Skin, White Masks, a psychoanalytic description of the effects of the
colonization on the colonized.61 The colonized Africans, Fanon argues, developed a deep
inferiority complex as they looked at themselves through the eyes of the colonizers and
become overwhelmed by the desire to be white.
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When shame is internalized, it is no longer one affect or feeling among many. It
becomes a deep permanent feeling of unworthiness. Kaufman writes, “‘I feel shame’
becomes transformed, given new meaning: ‘I am shameful, deficient in some vital way as
a human being.’”62 And Kaufman notes, “After shame becomes internalized, a new
shame experience, whether induced interpersonally or activated autonomously, must be
defended against . . . because exposure both to others and oneself has become
intolerable.”63
Kaufman then identifies six of the most prominent types of internalized shame
defenses. They are rage, contempt, striving for power, striving for perfection, the transfer
of blame, and internal withdrawal.64 Rage is one of the most spontaneous defenses
against shame. It may be expressed toward the self for not being careful enough and thus
making the exposure happen. Or it may be expressed toward other, especially the one
who caused the experience of shame. When rage is expressed toward the other, it serves
the purpose of transferring the shame to that person. Contempt as a defense mechanism
against shame is not as natural as rage. It involves rejection, be it the self or other. By
rejecting itself, or the other, the self protects itself from future experience of shame.
Striving for power “is a direct attempt to compensate for the sense of
defectiveness” that underlies an experience of shame. The self thinks that having control
over its flaws, the other, and the circumstances might save it from another shame
experience. “Instead of striving for power,” Kaufman writes, “an individual may quest
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after perfection. This, like power-seeking, is a striving against shame and attempts to
compensate for an underlying sense of defectiveness. If I can become perfect, no longer
am I so vulnerable to shame.”65
Blaming is as spontaneous as rage. It is about blaming the self or other for causing
the shame. Internal withdrawal involves retreating inside the self and then engaging in
internal fantasy and imagery in order to sooth the painful experience of shame. This
defense mechanism is more likely utilized by people with introverted temperament, as
Kaufman writes,
When an individual with a given introverted nature is forced to contend with
excessive shame, excessive beyond current capacity to cope or due to some
failure of the supporting interpersonal environment, that individual is likely to fall
back upon his [or her] own natural tendency to withdraw inside as a useful means
of adaptation.66
In sum, shame may be internalized through affect-shame binds, drive-shame
binds, and need-shame-binds. Besides, it may be internalized through family secrets,
mysteries, and myths. It may also be internalized through abuse (physical, verbal, and/or
emotional), stigma (illness, weight, disability, and addiction), gender expectations,
racism, and colonization. This list, of course, is not comprehensive. There are many other
factors through which shame may be internalized. For instance, in his book Shame:
Theory, Therapy, Theology, Pattison argues that “certain aspects of Christian ideology or
theology can intersect with personal experience to generate or maintain a sense of shame
or defilement. [Also] some of the ways in which the practices of the Christian community
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may reflect, amplify and confirm the dynamics of chronic shame or defilement in
individuals and in groups.”67
Conclusion
From a social-scientific perspective, shame can be categorized into three forms—
discretion, disgrace, and internalized. Discretion shame is the sense of shame that
protects our humanness both at the personal and social levels. It is integral to being
human. Disgrace shame is the painful experience of being ashamed, which involves
feeling of diminishment and fear of disconnection. Disgrace shame may be internalized
through different socially-related factors and create a shame-based identity, a personality
character containing a constant feeling of unworthiness and chronic fear of rejection.
Disgrace shame and internalized shame are disintegrative at both the intrapersonal and
interpersonal levels. Wurmser is therefore right when he observes that “shame in its
typical features is complex and variable, a range of closely related affects rather than one
simple, clearly delimited one. It shades into moods on one side, into attitudes on the
other.”68
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A Theological Interpretation of Shame
In the Lutheran tradition, God’s word is conceived as both law and Gospel. The
law has two uses.69 Its first use is to protect and to sustain social orders by promoting
civil conduct. The law demands the performance of good works. This use of the law is
known as the “civil” or “political” use (usus civilis or usus politicus). The second use of
the law, known as the “theological” or “spiritual” use (usus theologicus or usus
spiritualis), is to reveal human’s sinful nature and sinful deeds. This second use,
however, is deemed primary, as Luther writes in the Smalcald Article, “The foremost
office or power of the law is that it reveals inherited sin and its fruits. It shows human
beings into what utter depths their nature has fallen and how completely corrupt it is.”70 I
shall interpret shame from the perspective of these two uses of the law in the Lutheran
tradition in order to show that shame, in addition to its personal and social functions, also
has theological function.
Shame and the First Use of the Law
At least two things can be said about the relationship between shame and the first
use of the law. One, discretion shame may be analogously associated with the law in its
first use. Discretion shame sustains and protects our personal and social ordering of the
world. The law in its first use, by promoting civil conduct, also seeks to sustain and
protect social orders. Moreover, Luther, in agreement with Paul, contends that the work
of the law is written on our hearts, and that our conscience bears witness to it (Romans
For a succinct summary on the two uses of the law, see Part III, Article II, “Concerning the
Law,” of The Smalcald Articles, which may be found in Kolb and Wengert, eds., The Book of Concord,
311-12.
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2:15). In other words, the law functions as “a sense of shame,” i.e., discretion shame, that
drives us to serve the well-being of the neighbor.
The law is good and holy. Indeed, it is spiritual. However, the law does not secure
our core being and identity as human beings. Only the gospel, the righteousness of Christ
bestowed upon us through the Word of promise, does so. As Broucek rightly points out,
discretion shame is crucial to our personal and collective emotional, moral, and spiritual
well-being.71 However, in opposition to Schneider’s claim, a sensitivity to discretion
shame will not result in any better understanding of what it means to be fully human.72
The law in its first use belongs to the earthly realm and produces only “earthly
righteousness” or “active righteousness,” to use Luther’s expressions. Likewise, a
sensitivity to discretion shame produces only earthly or active righteousness. This kind of
righteousness is an inadequate basis for defining what it means to be fully human. What
defines our humanity fully is righteousness coram Deo and coram mundo simultaneously.
In fact, what determines our ultimate identity is righteousness coram Deo.
Two, disgrace shame and internalized shame may prevent a person from fulfilling
the law. As shown above, disgrace shame generates contempt either toward the self or
other, or both. Contempt is a feeling that more likely leads a person to commit lifealienating reactions, again either toward the self or other, or both. Internalized shame, on
the other hand, might lead to destructive compulsory behaviors, such as addiction to
alcohol, drugs, food, sex, to name a few. Addiction may destroy the self and the
neighbor, and thus violate the first use of the law. Furthermore, disgrace shame and
71
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internalized shame bring about perfectionism. No one, however, can ever attain
perfection, no matter how hard one strives for it. In fact, perfectionism is a form of selfrighteousness or self-justification. A perfectionist thinks that he or she can be good and
accepted only by being perfect. Such attitude violates the gospel, which is God’s
acceptance of the unacceptable, to use Paul Tillich’s language.73
Shame and the Second Use of the Law
At least two things also can be said about the relationship between shame and the
second use of the law. On one hand, the law in its theological use causes shame. The law
always accuses (lex semper accusat). It accuses the conscience and makes it, “terrified,
humbled, despondent, and despairing,” to use Luther’s language.74 Arthur B. Holmes
cogently argues that Luther understands the conscience as the self.75 As already pointed
out, shame is affecting and affected by the whole self. In other words, the law in its
theological use, by accusing the conscience, produces shame. Shame occurs, Dietrich
Bonhoeffer argues, when we realize, through the accusations of the law, that we are
sinful, and that we lay bare before God and cannot run away from God’s presence.76
Since we cannot escape from God,77 the shame of sin is deeply engrained in our
human nature. “Shame,” Bonhoeffer writes, “is man’s ineffaceable recollection of his

73

Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1956), 164.

74

Ibid.

Arthur B. Holmes, “Nos Extra Nos: Luther's Understanding of the Self as Conscience,” The
Drew Gateway 53, no. 1 (1982).
75

76

Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, trans. Neville Horton Smith, The Library of Philosophy and
Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 145.
77

Cf. Psalm 139.

90
estrangement from the origin; it is grief for this estrangement, the powerless longing to
return to unity with the origin. Man is ashamed because he has lost something which is
essential to his original character, to himself as a whole; he is ashamed of his
nakedness.”78 It is to be noted, however, that the shame because of sin should not be
confused with internalized shame. The latter is made possible by the former. That is, our
shame because of our sinful nature is the basis for internalized shame. The two are
distinct, with the shame of sin having priority over internalized shame; yet the two are
inseparable.
On the other hand, shame may lead a person to the gospel. The main purpose of
the second use of the law is to prepare a person to receive the gospel. Shame may serve
such purpose. As aforesaid in the introductory chapter, my awareness of my shame has
led me to authentically live the reality of justification. And I believe, based on my
experience, that when we acknowledge our shame, the gospel confronts this binding
disease, dismantles its bondage, and reveals our true identity, which is we are accepted by
God. Lynd states that “shame if confronted full in the face may throw an unexpected light
on who one is and point the way toward who one may become. Full faced, shame may
become not primarily something to be covered, but a positive experience of revelation.”79
The gospel can confront shame full in the face.
Because the law brings about shame when revealing our sin, it is important to
discuss the connection between shame and sin.
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Shame and Sin
When revealed through the law, sin generates both guilt and shame, but primarily
shame. Adam and Eve, before the Fall, were naked, but they were not ashamed (Genesis
2:25). After the Fall, however, their eyes were opened, “and they knew that they were
naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made loincloths for themselves” (Genesis
3:7). Besides, “they hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God among the trees of
the garden” (Genesis 3:8). In other words, they were ashamed.
Moreover, we have discussed that shame is related to what we are, whereas guilt
is related to what we do. Sin involves what we are and what we do. It is both ontological
and ethical or behavioral. We are sinners and we commit sinful deeds. However, though
these two aspects of sin are inseparable, and need to be distinguished, the ontological
aspect has logical priority over the behavioral. We sin because we are sinners.
Unfortunately, despite the primacy of our sinful nature over our sinful deeds, and
the clear connection the bible makes between sin and shame, the Christian church has
interpreted sin mainly on the basis of guilt and seen salvation principally as forgiveness
of sins. In the Lutheran tradition in particular, as already indicated, the doctrine of
justification, the article upon which the church stands and falls, has been understood onesidedly as forensic, i.e., proclamation of forgiveness.
Consequently, shame has received a negligible amount of sustained theological
attention. Pattison, surveying recent Christian theological discussions on shame,
including the works of the great theologians of the twentieth century, such as Karl Barth,
Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, among others, concludes,
Within the theological arena, shame has not been a major discrete category for
analysis and understanding, even in the context of discussions about atonement.
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Theologians use the word shame en passant, but most direct theological attention
has been focused upon guilt and offence as the main constituents of sin and
alienation from God and humanity. A number of theologians do allow some
significance to shame in their writings. However, often their understandings of
shame are partial, arbitrary or desultory. Shame has yet to receive the
comprehensive theological examination that it deserves.80
For shame to have the theological examination it deserves, the church needs to
interpret sin primarily in relation to shame. Doing so will actually bring to light the
importance of the “new creation” or “re-creation” that the resurrection of Christ has
brought about. This is important because, as Forde asserts, when the resurrection aspect
of salvation or justification is restored to its proper place, the explosive character of the
Christian message can come to light once again.81
Guilt can be dealt with easily by confession and penance. Nathanson writes,
“Whenever we feel guilty, we can pay for the damage inflicted. The confessional is a
system of release from guilt, for it allows us to do penance for sins we know we have
committed—a simple trade of one action for another.”82 Interpreting sin in relation to
guilt may conceal the gravity of our sinful nature.
Shame, on the contrary, in the words of Lynd, “cannot be modified by addition, or
wiped out by subtraction, or exorcised by expiation. It is not an isolated act that can be
detached from the self. It carries the weight of ‘I cannot have done this. But I have done it
and I cannot undo it, because this is I.’”83 In other words, shame requires re-creation. Its
remedy is the reality of the “New Creation,” i.e., the “New Being,” in Christ. “[I]f anyone
80
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is in Christ, he [or she] is a new creation. The old has passed away; behold, the new has
come” (2 Corinthians 5:17, ESV).
Moreover, interpreting sin primarily in relation to shame is beneficial for the
practice of pastoral care and counseling. In his article “The Shame Factor: Theological
and Pastoral Reflections Relating to Forgiveness,” Albers argues that “disgrace shame
stands as a significant barrier to the hearing and appropriation of the words of
forgiveness.”84 For him, forgiveness is for guilt, and guilt is different from shame. He
associates guilt with phenomenology, and shame with ontology.85 Thus, guilt can be
amended, but shame cannot.86 What shame needs is acceptance.87 “What is at the core of
the gospel,” he writes, “is God’s grace, understood as forgiveness for one’s guilt and
acceptance for one’s shame.”88
Albers notes, “Pastoral care for people with disgrace shame will have to start not
with forgiveness but with ‘acceptance.’”89 Furthermore, he contends that people with a
shame-based identity need to know that they are accepted by God through Christ and that
“their identity is inextricably bound up and determined by the life, death, and resurrection
of Christ,” before they can appropriate the words of forgiveness.90 In other words,
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pastoral theologians need to deal with shame before dealing with guilt. But before we
further discuss strategies for the healing of shame, we shall describe the patterns and
dynamics of shame in the Malagasy context as my research has shown.

CHAPTER FIVE
MALAGASY SHAME: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY DESCRIPTION
The previous chapter functioned as the interpretive move of this work and
interpreted shame from social scientific and theological perspectives. From a social
scientific perspective, the chapter showed that shame has three forms—discretion,
disgrace, and internalized. Discretion shame creates boundaries that serve the well-being
of the self and others. This type of shame is integral to being human both at the personal
and social levels. Disgrace shame is painful and is disintegrative also at the personal and
social levels. Moreover, disgrace shame can be internalized and creates an identity that is
shame-based. A shame-based identity may develop through different social factors. From
a theological perspective, the chapter demonstrated that discretion shame, disgrace
shame, and internalized shame, have a theological dimension as well. Thus, shame, in its
discretion, disgrace, and internalized forms, has personal, social, and theological
dynamics.
The current chapter shall take on the descriptive-empirical move and describe the
patterns and dynamics of shame among Malagasy. The descriptive-empirical task,
according to Osmer, aims to answer the question “What is going on?” and gathers data
that help determine patterns and dynamics of a particular episode, situation, or context.
With its aim to explain and understand why something is going on in a given episode,
situation, or context, the interpretive task sets a theoretical framework for the descriptive95
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empirical task. Therefore, I shall use the three forms of shame (discretion, disgrace, and
internalized), and the three dynamics of shame (personal, social, and theological) as
frameworks to describe the patterns and dynamics of shame among Malagasy. Before
delving into the exploration of the patterns of shame among Malagasy and their
dynamics, however, I shall first discuss my research methodology and design.
Research Methodology and Design
I explored the patterns and dynamics of shame among Malagasy by conducting
in-depth interviews among lay ministers called “shepherds”1 who work in the MLC
tobys.2 My research questions were: “How does shame function among MLC toby
shepherds and how does it affect their ministry?,” “What words do they use to describe
this phenomenon and its effects in their ministry?” and “How do these shepherds deal
with shame?” In other words, what resources do they use to address and heal shame?
I am interested in the exploration of the patterns and dynamics of shame among
shepherds working in the tobys because I would like to promote an awareness and
understanding of shame for MLC shepherds and beyond through future workshops or any
form of training. As mentioned previously, being aware of and understanding shame is
important for doing pastoral care and counseling.3 I am interested in the toby settings

1
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because the tobys are at the heart of the MLC care ministry. To study the life of the tobys
is the same as to study the care ministry of MLC.
The MLC has more than one hundred regular tobys and three main ones—
Ankaramalaza, Soatanàna, and Farihimena. I chose to focus my research on the main
tobys. Due to bad road conditions, however, I did not have access to Farihimena.
Therefore, my data on the patterns and dynamics of shame among Malagasy were
gathered from shepherds who work in Ankaramalaza and Soatanàna. I chose to focus my
research on the main tobys because the care ministry practice in the MLC regular tobys
depends so much on the models practiced in the main ones that I can, to some extent,
generalize my findings from the main tobys to the regular.
I explored the patterns and dynamics of shame among shepherds in Ankaramalaza
and Soatanàna using a qualitative simple exploratory methodology. Robert A. Stebbins
defines exploratory research as follows:
Social science exploration is a broad-ranging, purposive, systematic, prearranged
undertaking designed to maximize the discovery of generalizations leading to
description and understanding of an area of social or psychological life. Such
exploration is, depending on the standpoint taken, a distinctive way of conducting
science—a scientific process—a special methodological approach (as contrasted
with confirmation), and a pervasive personal orientation of the explorer. The
emergent generalizations are many and varied; they include descriptive facts, folk
concepts, cultural artifacts, structural arrangements, social processes, and beliefs
and belief systems normally found there.4
I opted for this particular method because of my aim to describe and understand
areas of psychological and social life—patterns and dynamics of shame. Moreover, I
chose exploratory research method because the patterns and dynamics of shame among
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MLC toby shepherds have not received any thorough empirical analysis. Stebbins
recommends that “exploration is the preferred methodological approach . . . when a
group, process, activity, or situation has received little or no systematic empirical
scrutiny.”5 Also, he writes, “Researchers explore when they have little or no scientific
knowledge about the group, process, activity, or situation they want to examine but
nevertheless have reason to believe it contains elements worth discovering.”6 I had little
knowledge of the patterns and dynamics of shame among toby shepherds, but I knew that
this aspect of toby shepherds’ life is worth discovering.
I conducted three individual in-depth interviews in Soatanàna and three individual
in-depth interviews in Ankaramalaza. All three participants in Soatanàna were men,
whereas all three participants in Ankaramalaza were women. Due to the sensitivity of my
topic, I chose a purposive sampling to select my interviewees. In a purposive sampling,
the researcher chooses specific people within the population to use for a particular study
or research project. The idea behind it is to concentrate on people with particular
characteristics who will better be able to assist with the relevant research. Therefore, to
select my interviewees, I announced and explained my research in the church and invited
people to participate in the interview voluntarily.
In Soatanàna, willing participants had to gain the consent of the toby
superintendent. This is part of the rules that are at work in this particular toby. Any
shepherd who volunteers to participate in any research interview has to have
authorization from the superintendent before he or she can proceed. The superintendent
5
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approved three men to participate in my research. In Ankaramalaza, participants were
free to participate directly in the interview as they choose to. But to balance the gender of
my participants, I deliberately selected three women.
The age range of the interviewees is between twenty-two and fifty-eight years old
and each interviewee signed a form of consent before the interview (See Appendix A). I
developed one interview protocol for all the interviews (See Appendix B). Each interview
was conducted in Malagasy, the local and official language of Madagascar, and lasted for
one hour to one hour and half. Throughout the interviews, I used digital audio-recorders,
but at the same time took notes. I also used a journal to keep notes of my research process
and any other relevant information. The research was conducted between June 10 and
July 15, 2015.
The research conformed to the standards of the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
at Luther Seminary. Thus, the records of this study are kept confidential. All electronic
data have been kept in a password-protected file in my personal computer (which is
already a password-protected computer as well). All hard-copy data have been kept in a
locked file in my study room. Only my advisor, Theresa Latini, and I have access to the
data and the audio recordings. The data will be destroyed by July 15, 2018, three years
after its collection. In the present data analysis, I do not include any information that
makes it possible to identify my interviewees. However, while I make every effort to
ensure confidentiality, anonymity cannot be guaranteed due to the small number studied.
I transcribed the data and manually coded them in Malagasy. In terms of coding, I
used word-by-word, line-by-line, phrase-by-phrase, theme-by-theme, concept-by-concept

100
coding, as suggested by Kathy Charmaz.7 Two main themes emerged after the analysis of
the data. The two themes are: 1) shame has three patterns—fahalalana menatra,
fahafahambaraka, and hasaronkenatra, and 2) shame can be healed. In addition, my data
revealed that all three patterns of shame affect the shepherds’ lives at the personal, social,
and theological levels. That is, the three patterns of shame have personal, social, and
theological dynamics. These dynamics of shame could be categorized as an independent
theme. However, I will merge the description of these dynamics of shame with the
description of the three patterns of shame, as they are interconnected.
The Patterns and Dynamics of Shame among Malagasy
Fahalalana Menatra
All my interviewees identified this pattern of shame. They described it as a sense
of shame before an act. Fahalalana is a Malagasy noun which means “knowledge.” And
menatra is a Malagasy verb which means “being ashamed. “I am ashamed” may be
glossed in Malagasy as “menatra (being ashamed) aho (I).” Fahalalana menatra, then,
means, literally, “knowledge of being ashamed,” that is, “the ability to know shame,” or,
in the language of Schneider, “a sense of shame.” For toby shepherds, fahalalana
menatra is an important virtue to have. An interviewee insists that “a person who has no
sense of shame does not deserve to be a shepherd!”8
First, fahalalana menatra safeguards a shepherd as a shepherd. Toby shepherds
are expected to be role models for the toby community in particular and for the
7
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community at large in general. People expect them to be kind, caring, and wise people of
prayer, just to mention a few traits. A sense of shame will help a shepherd behave
according to people’s expectations, as one interviewee states: “Wherever you are, even
where people might not know that you are a shepherd, you always need to keep in mind
that you are a shepherd. This will help you to be careful with your reactions and
behaviors and protects you not be dishonored.”9 Second, fahalalana menatra safeguards
the toby as a community. As we shall see below, when a toby shepherd becomes
dishonored, the toby she or he belongs to is dishonored also. Third, behaving well as a
shepherd is considered as giving glory to God. A shepherd stated that “when you respect
yourself as a shepherd, you actually give glory to God.”10
Fahafahambaraka
All my interviewees also acknowledged this pattern of shame. While fahalalana
menatra was described by my interviewees as a sense of shame before an act,
fahafahambaraka was described as an experience of shame after an act. This is the
difference between these two patterns of shame. According to my interviewees,
fahafahambaraka is a Malagasy noun, which is a combination of two different nouns:
fahafahana and baraka. Fahafahana comes from the root word afaka, which can mean
“to be able to,” “to be allowed to,” “to pass a test or an exam,” etc., when used as a verb,
and “removed” or “taken away,” when used as an adjective. Here it is used as an

“N’aiza n’aiza alehanao, na amin’ny toerana tsy mahafantatara anao ho mpiandry aza ny olona
ao, dia tsy maintsy tandrovana mandrakariva ny maha-mpiandry. Rehefa apetrakao ao an-tsainao ao foana
hoe mpiandry ianao, dia tsy ho sahinao ny hanao fihetsika sy fiteny mamoa fady sy manala-baraka.”
9
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adjective. Baraka is a noun which means “honor.” Afaka baraka, or, in proper Malagasy,
afa-baraka, thus, means “deprived of honor,” or “dishonored.” The noun
fahafahambaraka denotes the state of being dishonored. A person becomes afa-baraka
when she or he breaks any significant rules or taboos of the community she or he belongs
to. Theft, for instance, generates fahafahambaraka.11
A person’s fahafahambaraka is personal as well as social or communal. A toby
shepherd’s fahafahambaraka is a fahafahambaraka for the toby community which she or
he works for. An interviewee gave the following illustration: “If a toby shepherd is
caught stealing somebody’s belongings, he or she is not the only one dishonored, the toby
community as a whole also is. Indeed, we all are dishonored!”12 In addition, a toby’s
fahafahambaraka is also a fahafahambaraka before God. All my interviewees asserted
that a toby is a holy place, chosen and sanctified by God. To dishonor a toby is therefore a
shame before God. In fact, my interviewees suggested that the person who brought the
shame into the toby and the toby community as a whole needs to repent before God.
Hasaronkenatra
This pattern of shame was acknowledged only by the three female interviewees.
They described hasaronkenatra as a Malagasy noun which derives from two different
nouns: sarona and henatra. Sarona, depending on the context, can mean “cover” or

An interviewee puts it as follows: “Afa-baraka ny olona iray rehefa manao ny zavatra tsy tokony
hatao eo amin’ny fiarahamonina, toy ny fady sy ny fitsipika aman-dalàna maro samihafa. Ny halatra,
ohatra, dia maha-afa-baraka!”
11
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“covered.” Here it means “covered.” Henatra, which derives from the verb menatra,13
can denote the genitals, but here it denotes “shame.” Sarona henatra, in proper Malagasy
saron-kenatra, therefore, means “covered by shame,” in the sense of “bound by shame.”
A person who is saron-kenatra is a person who has internalized shame so that his or her
identity becomes shame-bound. Hasaronkenatra then denotes the state of being shamebound.
My interviewees describe hasaronkenatra as a “complexe d’infériorité”
(inferiority complex). An interviewee states, “When you are saron-kenatra, like me, you
feel deeply inside you that you are inferior and small . . . very small.”14 For the toby
shepherds, this feeling of inferiority creates fear of participation in the usual shepherd’s
activities, such as worship leadership, prayer for the people, preaching, and exorcism.
These activities are believed to serve and contribute to the well-being of the toby as
community.
In Ankaramalaza, also in Soatanàna, there is a devotional service that is held
twice a day, in the morning and in the afternoon. The service includes hymns, scripture
readings, sermons, exorcism, and prayers for the people. Sermons, exorcism, and prayers
are done by shepherds. The sermon tasks in particular are usually assigned. But when the
assigned preacher is absent, any shepherd present in the service is expected to volunteer
and fill in. Hasaronkenatra, according to my interviewees, creates fear and prevents a
shepherd from volunteering for preaching. “Yesterday, for instance,” an interviewee
shared, “the assigned preacher did not come. . . . I wanted to volunteer, but I was so
13
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scared. . . . Two voices were competing in my head. One voice says ‘go and do it.’
Another voice, however, says, ‘you have nothing to say. You will be exposed. . . . And I
did not do it!”15 Then, she continued, “When I get home, I felt ashamed of myself, I am
still feeling ashamed. . . . And I am feeling ashamed before God.”16
Shame Can Be Healed
My interviewees unanimously believe that shame can be healed. It can be healed
through prayer, exorcism, and the hearing of the Word of God. Prayer is believed to be
powerful. The statement, “Prayer changes things,”17 was used to support this claim.
Female interviewees believe that hasaronkenatra may be natural or from the devil. They
stated that in either case, prayer and exorcism can help with its healing. An interviewee
testified, “I used to be saronkenatra, but one of my teachers18 told me to pray and attend
exorcism every day to heal my shame. I followed his advice and now I am not
saronkenatra anymore.”19 All interviewees stated that the Word of God may bring
comfort at any time of shame experience.

“Ohatra ’zao an, omaly, ts’avy gny mpitoriteny. Da nagniry mafy agnatiko agny iaho hagnano
anazy, nefa da natahotry. . . . Nisyy feo roy gny tagnatiko tao. Hoy gn’eritreritroko raiky en, ‘ndana,
ataovy. Fa hoy gn’eritreritriko raiky koa ‘ino gny raha ho zakainao egny zao? Afa-baraka egny anao
androany. . . . Da tsy nagnano ma rô iaho!’”
15

“Lefa avy tandragno anefa iaho, da nahatsiaro megnatry tagnatiko tagny iao, da mbola megnatry
iaho zao e. . . . sady mahatsiaro megnatry eo anatrehan’Andriamanitra!”
16
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“Ny vavaka manova zavatra.”

18

As mentioned above, shepherds are trained theologically for two years. The interviewee here
referred to one of his teachers during this two-year training.
“Iaho taloha da saronkegnatry ma. Fa gny mpampianatry anahy niteny hoe mivavaha
isan’andro, da magnatogna koa asa sy fampaherezagny isan’andro, f’ho hitanao fa da ho afaky io
hegnatrinao io. Narahiko gny torohevitriny seky. Da tsy saronkegnatry koa iaho zao.”
19
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Limitation of the Research
The findings of this research are limited in many ways. The number of people
interviewed, which is six in total, is too small for generalizability. Furthermore, though
all my interviewees identified the first pattern of shame, fahafahambaraka, and the
second pattern, fahafahambaraka, only the female interviewees identified the third one,
hasaronkenatra. Further research, therefore, needs to be conducted in order to identify
the correlation between gender and hasaronkenatra. Also, though I expected to identify
the effects of shame on the ministry of my interviewees, the data revealed only the effects
of shame on their lives at the personal, social, and theological levels. Again, further
research needs to be carried out in order to describe the correlation between shame and
the shepherds’ ministry. Moreover, I expected to find out about the importance of shame
awareness for the shepherds. However, the interviewees confused the notion of shame
awareness with shame experience. Finally, my interviewees did not make any connection
between the origin of hasaronkenatra and family systems, abuse, stigma, gender
expectations, racism, or colonization. Further research needs to be done to identity the
correlation of this pattern of shame to these factors.
Conclusion
The data of this study revealed that there are three patterns of shame among
Malagasy—fahalalana menatra, fahafahambaraka, and hasaronkenatra. Fahalalana
menatra is a sense of shame before an act. It is integral to the life of the shepherds and
the toby community as a whole. Fahafahambaraka is an experience of being ashamed. It
is painful and disintegrative at the personal, communal/social, and theological levels.
Fahalalana menatra is the state of being bound by shame. It is disintegrative at the
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personal, communal/social, and theological levels. The three patterns of shame among
Malagasy therefore correspond respectively with discretion shame, disgrace shame, and
internalized shame described in chapter four. Discretion shame is a sense of shame before
a given act. Disgrace shame is the actual experience of being ashamed. And internalized
shame generates a shame-bound identity.
As enunciated above, my interviewees believe that hasaronkenatra can be healed
through prayer, exorcism, and the hearing of the Word of God. I agree with them.
However, I agree more with Pattison, who notes that “Christians would argue that
specifically religious healing methods such as prayer should be the main, and possibly the
sole, means of effecting cure,”20 but that “Christians should be prepared to learn about
how to understand and work with shame from other disciplines. This will help to prevent
either evasion or facile optimism in relation to dysfunctional shame and will deepen an
integrative religious response.”21 The next two chapters shall therefore discuss strategies
for the healing of shame respectively from social scientific and theological perspectives.
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CHAPTER SIX
HEALING SHAME: A SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVE
This work has so far discussed three out of the four tasks of the practical
theological interpretation. The two previous chapters, serving respectively as the
interpretive and the descriptive-empirical tasks, interpreted and described shame from an
interdisciplinary perspective. Chapters four concluded that shame has two forms—
discretion and disgrace. Disgrace shame, however, may be internalized and form a
shame-based identity. Hence, one can conclude that shame has three forms—discretion,
disgrace, and internalized. All three forms have personal, social, and theological
dynamics.
Chapter five showed that there are three patterns of shame among Malagasy—
fahalalana menatra, fahafahambaraka, and hasaronkenatra. The three patterns
correspond respectively with the three forms of shame discussed in chapter four. Also,
fahalalana menatra, fahafahambaraka, and hasaronkenatra all have personal, social, and
theological dynamics. Discretion shame/fahalalana menatra is integral to being human,
whereas disgrace shame/fahafahambaraka and internalized shame/hasaronkenatra are
disintegrative. Therefore, I would like to suggest that disgrace shame/fahafahambaraka
and internalized shame/hasaronkenatra need to be healed at the personal, social, and
theological levels.
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Chapters two and three, functioning as the normative task, developed the two
kinds of righteousness as an interdisciplinary framework that would guide the
interpretation and the description of shame, as well as the choice for strategies for its
healing, i.e., the pragmatic task, which the present chapter and the next shall undertake.
According to Osmer, the pragmatic task seeks to answer the question “How should we
respond?,” and looks for strategies that might influence a particular episode, situation, or
context. The two kinds of righteousness as an interdisciplinary framework, as noted,
recommend that pastoral theologians suggest healing for shame from both theological
and social scientific perspectives. Therefore, the present task shall cover two chapters.
The current chapter shall discuss strategy for the healing of shame from a social scientific
perspective, whereas the next chapter shall discuss strategy for the healing of shame from
a theological perspective.
In the present chapter, I shall claim, from a social scientific perspective,
specifically drawing upon Brown’s works, that the strongest antidote for shame is
empathy.1 In other words, empathy heals shame. Self-empathy and empathy from other
heals the shame of the self, whereas empathy toward other may contribute to the healing
of the other’s shame. Moreover, drawing upon Siegel’s works, I shall also claim that selfempathy and empathy toward other are the linchpins of what is called in IPNB
“integration,” the heart of well-being.2
According to Brown, empathy is a skill. “I believe,” she writes, “that empathy is
best understood as a skill because being empathic, or having the capacity to show
1
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empathy, is not a quality that is innate or intuitive. We might be naturally sensitive to
others, but there is more to empathy than sensitivity.”3 As a skill, empathy can be
learned. And it can be learned and developed at any time in the lifespan. The question is:
How does one develop the skill of empathy? As this chapter unfolds, it will become clear
that NVC can help with the cultivation and development of empathy, as it educates
people to be empathic both toward the self and toward other, as well as to be able to
receive empathy from other.
The present chapter therefore falls into three sections. Section one shall discuss
the importance of empathy for shame resilience. Section two shall discuss the
interconnection between empathy and integration. And section three shall discuss the role
of NVC in the cultivation of empathy.
Empathy and Shame Resilience
In her book I Thought It Was Just Me (but It Isn’t): Making the Journey from
“What Will People Think?” to “I am Enough”, Brown proposes a shame resilience that
has four elements in it. The four elements are: 1) recognizing shame and understanding
our triggers, 2) practicing critical awareness, 3) reaching out, and 4) speaking shame.4
Recognizing shame is being aware of the physical, emotional, mental, or even
spiritual symptoms of shame when it strikes. Does your chest tighten when you feel
shame? Or does your mind go blank? Where do you feel the effects of shame in you?
Understanding our triggers involves identifying the events or circumstances that most
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likely trigger our shame, such as appearance, parenting, aging, work, religion, addiction,
family, etc. Critical awareness involves knowing why an experience of shame arises in us
and how it affects us emotionally, cognitively, and behaviorally. It is to be mindful of our
shame experience as it arises. Reaching out involves sharing our experience of shame
with someone that can relate to us with empathy. And speaking shame involves
cultivating shame awareness to the general public. Shame is a silent disease. It loves
silence and it thrives well when it is kept silent. When we speak about it, however, shame
loses its power.
Empathy, both toward the self, i.e. self-empathy, and from other, is the
preconditions for these four elements of shame resilience. First, to recognize shame and
to understand our triggers, to practice critical awareness, to reach out, and to speak shame
all need some degree of self-empathy. Kristin Neff, a leading scholar in self-empathy, or
in her preferred terminology, self-compassion, describes this particular skill as being kind
and understanding, instead of mercilessly judging and criticizing, when confronted with
personal failings.5 Self-compassion has three essential components: self-kindness,
common humanity, and mindfulness:
Self-kindness, by definition, means that we stop the constant self-judgment and
disparaging internal commentary that most of us have come to see as normal. It
requires us to understand our foibles and failures instead of condemning them. It
entails clearly seeing the extent to which we harm ourselves through relentless
self-criticism, and ending our internal war.6
Common humanity consists of remembering that we all suffer in one way or
another. The triggers, the circumstances, and the degrees of our suffering might be
5
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different. However, we all feel pain when we suffer.7 Neff defines mindfulness as “a
form of ‘meta-awareness,’ which means awareness of awareness. Instead of simply
feeling anger, I am aware that I am now feeling anger.”8 When applied to shame,
mindfulness means that one is aware that one is feeling shame. That is, one is critically
aware of shame, recognizes it, and understands its triggers.
Self-compassion, Neff argues, enhances emotional intelligence, the type of
intelligence that entails the ability to monitor our emotions and to skillfully alter them
and guide our thinking and action. In other words, emotional intelligence is the ability to
be aware of our feelings without being swept by them, but being able to make wise
choices.9 Moreover, self-compassion helps us to accept who we are regardless of the
judgment or praise we receive from others. It helps us to do so because it “does not try to
capture and define the worth or essence of who we are. It is not a thought or a label, a
judgment or an evaluation. Instead, self-compassion is a way of relating to the mystery of
who we are.”10 Lastly, self-compassion enhances motivation and self-growth by helping
us to be more authentic and autonomous in our life.
Moreover, Brown, drawing upon Neff, notes, “Self-compassion is key because
when we’re able to be gentle to ourselves in the midst of shame, we’re more likely to
reach out, connect, and experience empathy.”11 In other words, self-compassion is the
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prerequisite for reaching out. And I believe that self-compassion is also the prerequisite
for speaking shame. Shame is hard to communicate without certain degree of kindness
toward the self. In sum, self-compassion, or self-empathy, is the foundation for the four
elements of shame resilience.
Second, Brown, based on her empirical research on the correlation between
empathy and shame resilience, maintains that empathy from other is the strongest
antidote for shame. For her, the importance of self-empathy in the process of shame
resilience, as stated in the quote above, is to help us to reach out for empathy. “Empathy,”
she claims, “creates a hostile environment for shame—it can’t survive.”12 That is,
empathy dissipates shame.
Empathy, for Brown, is the ability or skill to tap into our own inner experiences in
order to connect with an experience someone is sharing with us.13 It has four defining
elements: 1) to be able to see the world as others see it, 2) to be nonjudgmental, 3) to
understand another person’s feelings, and 4) to communicate our understanding of that
person’s feeling.14 In other words, “empathy [is] ‘the ability to perceive a situation from
the other person’s perspective. To see, hear and feel the unique world of the other.’”15
In conclusion, self-empathy and empathy from other are the cornerstones of
shame resilience. Since empathy from other is a crucial element for the healing of one’s
shame, I believe that empathy toward other also contributes enormously to the alleviation
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of the other’s shame. Most importantly, as I shall show below, self-empathy and empathy
toward other constitute what Siegel calls “integration,” the heart of health.
Empathy and Integration
Integration is an IPNB concept. And IPNB is a broad field that draws from the
findings of different disciplines exploring what it means to be human.16 Its basic
presupposition is that who we are is shaped by the interactions among the mind, the
brain, and our interpersonal relationships, and that our well-being consists of the
integration within and among these three elements.17
IPNB conceives of the mind, brain, and relationships as “three aspects of one
reality”—the flow of energy and information—rather than three separate elements. 18
Energy, in its very essence, despite the many ways physicists describe it and the various
forms it has, is the ability to perform an action, such as moving our limbs or even
thinking a thought.19 “We feel radiant energy when we sit in the sun,” Siegel writes, “we
use kinetic energy when we walk on the beach or go for a swim[;] we utilize neural
energy when we think, when we talk, when we listen, when we read.”20 Information, on
the other hand, “consists of swirls of energy that have symbolic meaning.”21 “These
words you are reading, or words that you hear,” Siegel illustrates, “are packets of
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information.”22 The mind “is the embodied and relational process that regulates the flow
of energy and information,” while the brain “is the embodied neural mechanism shaping
the flow,” and relationships “are the sharing of the flow.”23
Siegel claims that “[i]ntegration is the organizing principle that links the ways
energy and information flow is shared (relationships), is shaped (the mechanisms of the
embodied nervous system or, termed simply, the brain), and is regulated (the mind).”24
That is, integration involves the integration of the flow of energy and information both
within the nervous system and between people.
According to Siegel, integration is the process of linking differentiated parts of a
system into a functional whole. It is a process because it is never completely achieved.
The process of integration has two fundamental components—differentiation and
linkage:25
Differentiation is how parts of a system can become specialized, unique in their
growth, individualized in their development. Linkage involves the connection of
separate areas to each other. . . . When differentiated areas become linked, they
retain some of their essential qualities while also becoming a part of a functional
whole. Here we see how integration makes the whole greater than the sum of its
parts.26
One analogy that Siegel uses to describe the nature of integration is choral
harmony. When each member of the choir sings with his or her unique voice, and each
voice is agreeably linked with one another, a complex and harmonious melody emerges.
22
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“[The] balance between differentiated voices on the one hand and their linkage on the
other,” Siegel writes, “is the embodiment of integration.”27
The opposite of integration is rigidity and chaos. Rigidity is the absence of
differentiation. It is like a choir singing in unison. The voices are linked, but they are not
differentiated. Chaos, on the other hand, is the absence of linkage. To use the choir
analogy again, chaos is like singing chorally, but with each voice being off key. That is,
the voices are differentiated, but they are not linked.
Siegel identifies nine domains of integration, the first one being the integration of
consciousness. This type of integration, according to Siegel, is “the foundation for the
other domains.”28 It entails the integration of the sense of knowing and that which is
known, for consciousness is the state of being aware; and awareness has two distinct
elements—the subjective experience of awareness or the sense of knowing, and the
object of awareness or that which is known. These two elements need to be differentiated
and linked in order to promote consciousness well-being.
To cultivate consciousness integration, Siegel has proposed the “Wheel of
Awareness” practice, which he describes as follows:
The Wheel of Awareness is a reflective, “time-in” practice that uses the metaphor
of a wheel as a visual image for the mind. The hub represents the experience of
being aware. Points on the rim signify anything of which we can be aware. The
rim itself is divided into four segments. The first include the five senses that bring
in data from the outside world. The second segment represents the input from the
body—the “sixth sense.” The third segment of the rim represents our mental
activities, such as emotions, thoughts, images, and memories. A final segment
signifies our sense of connection to other people and to things outside our bodily
selves, such as our relationship to our community or our planet. The Wheel of
27
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Awareness practice enables an individual to gain the skill of differentiating the
elements of the rim from one another, and to distinguish the experience of
knowing (the hub) from that which is known (the rim). Through the systematic
focus of attention, this practice is designed to integrate consciousness.29
The second domain of integration that Siegel identifies is the bilateral or
horizontal integration, which involves the integration of the left and right hemispheres of
the brain. The left hemisphere “is responsible for logic, spoken and written language,
linearity, lists, and literal thinking,” whereas the right hemisphere “is the realm of
imagery, holistic thinking, nonverbal language, autobiographical memory, and a host of
other processes.”30 Horizontal integration “entails respecting differences while cultivating
collaborative connections between these two important but distinct ways of knowing.”31
The third domain of the nine is the vertical integration. It consists of the
integration of the data from the limbic and the brainstem areas, and the body proper. The
limbic area is responsible for processing emotion, motivation, various forms of memory,
and our attachment relationships. In other words, the limbic regulates the state of
receptivity in our body. The brainstem is the mechanism of basic arousal, alertness, the
physiological state of the body and the brain, and the fight-flight-or-freeze reaction to
threat, and regulates our bodily reactivity. Vertical integration is the integration of our
bodily sense of receptivity and reactivity.
Memory integration is the fourth domain. According to Siegel, there are two types
of memory; one is implicit and the other explicit. Implicit memory is the early form of
memory we develop even before our birth up to the first year of life. This type of memory
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has no recall of the experience or the time it occurred. It is a memory without subjective
internal experience.32 Hence, it makes us “act, feel, and imagine without recognition of
the influence of past experience on our present reality.”33 “If prior encounters with
animals with large teeth have shown that they present a danger,” Siegel illustrates, “then
within the memory of such an animal will be the association of fear. The next time we
encounter such a beast, we will be motivated by fear to run for safety.”34 Explicit
memory, conversely, is the memory we develop from the first year of life onward and
requires conscious awareness for encoding. It involves factual and autobiographical
memory. Memory integration, therefore, “is the linkage of differentiated implicit memory
into the explicit forms of factual and autobiographical memory with which we can
exercise intention and choice.”35
Narrative integration, the fifth domain, is interconnected with the horizontal
integration described above, as it is about harnessing the power of the left and the storage
of the right hemispheres of the brain in order to make sense of our narratively-shaped life.
A story is the linear telling of a sequence of events, and so naturally narrative
integration involves the left hemisphere’s linguistic, logical, linear drive to
explain the cause-effect relationships of things in life. But autobiographical
storage and the ability to understand our mental lives are predominantly rightsided affairs, suggesting that to tell a coherent story of our lives, we need
collaboration between these two differentiated, lateralized way of seeing and
being in the world.36
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The sixth domain, state integration, and the seventh, interpersonal integration, are
connected with each other. We humans are driven and motivated by essential needs such
as independence, mastery, autonomy, closeness, solitude, and love, just to mention a few.
State integration is the process of identifying my own needs in order to differentiate them
from the needs of others. It is, for instance, about giving myself time alone, if I am in
need of solitude. It is about integrating our needs at the “I” level. Interpersonal
integration, on the other hand, is the integration of our needs at the “we” level. It
“involves the honoring and relishing of differences while cultivating compassionate
connections with others.”37
The eighth domain of integration, temporal integration, is “the way we
differentiate our longing for certainty, permanence, and immortality from—and link them
with—the reality of life’s uncertainty, transience, and mortality.”38 We long for certainty,
but at the same time we know that we cannot control or predict the outcome of things.
We also know that we are mortal, and that nothing lasts forever. Siegel notes that as the
eight domains of integration described above are created and developed, the ninth and the
last domain, the transpirational integration, which he describes as “breathing across,”
arises. Transpirational integration
involves a person’s sense of coming to feel connected to a larger whole. The
“larger” here refers to a sense of belonging to something bigger than merely a
bodily defined sense of self (as in vertical integration), or even to friends and
family, as in interpersonal integration. Transpirational integration has the feeling
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that joining with others to give back to the world is as natural as taking care of
oneself.39
Integration and Mindsight
According to Siegel, integration may be cultivated through mindsight, the ability
to see and transform our own mental activities as well as those of others.40 Mindsight is a
mental ability; and the mind, as mentioned above, functions as a regulatory process of the
flow of energy and information. The mind’s regulatory role involves two-fold tasks—
monitoring and modifying. Siegel analogously describes these tasks as follows:
Consider the act of driving. To drive or “regulate” a car, you must both be aware
of its motion and its position in space and also be able to influence how it moves.
If you have your hands on the wheel but your eyes are shut (or focused in your
text message), you can make the car move, but you’re not driving it—because
driving means regulating the car’s movement, its flow, across time. If you have
your eyes open but you’re sitting in the backseat, you can monitor the movement
of the car (and make comments, like one particular relative I know), but you can’t
actually modify its motion yourself. (No matter how hard you try. Sorry.)41
Mindsight, therefore,
is a process that enables us to monitor and modify the flow of energy and
information within the [nervous system and within relationships]. The monitoring
aspect of mindsight involves sensing this flow within ourselves—perceiving it in
our own nervous systems, which we are calling Brain—and within others through
our Relationships, which involve the sharing of energy and information flow
through various means of communication. We then can modify this flow through
awareness and intention, fundamental aspects of our mind, directly shaping the
paths that energy and information flow take in our lives.42
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Moreover, the mind, in its very nature, is a product of both our inner neural
connections and our interpersonal communications with others.43 Our inner neural
connections include the neural connections throughout the whole body and are not
limited to the enskulled brain only. The brain is intricately interconnected with the whole
of the body through the spinal cord. The brain has three major areas—the neocortex or
cortex, the limbic, and the brainstem. The cortex, the upper area of the brain, creates the
“complex perceptual and abstract representations that constitute our associational thought
process.”44 It is the generator of our perceptions of the world, and our ability to think and
to reason. The limbic, the central area, processes emotion, motivation, various forms of
memory, and our attachment relationships.45 And the brainstem, the lower area, serves as
the mechanism of basic arousal, alertness, and the physiological state of the body and
brain. It also functions as the mechanism of the fight-flight-or-freeze reaction to threat.46
“Input to the brainstem and limbic areas,” Siegel notes, “comes from the spinal cord . . .
and ultimately rises up to our midline prefrontal regions in the cortex.”47 Our inner neural
connections therefore involve the nervous system as a whole.
Our interpersonal communications entail the sharing of energy and information
flow with one another. As already noted, energy is the ability to perform an action, such
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as moving our limbs or thinking a thought.48 Swirls of energy are going up and down our
body, moment by moment, as we think any thought, experience any emotion, and move
any part of our body. Information consists of swirls of energy that have symbolic
meaning, such as the words you are reading right now.49
Mindsight, therefore, enables us to perceive and to change our own mental
activities and those of others because the mind, the generator of mindsight, and which
functions as both a monitor and a modulator, is both embodied and relational. Besides,
we can understand the mental states of others thanks to what are known as “mirror
neurons.” Marco Iacoboni, a leading neurologist and neuroscientist, writes, “We achieve
our very subtle understanding of other people thanks to certain collections of special cells
in the brain called mirror neurons. These are the tiny miracles that get us through the day.
They are the heart of how we navigate through our lives. They bind us with each other,
mentally and emotionally.”50
Integration and Mindfulness
Siegel argues that through the monitoring role of the mind, mindsight may
provide us with mindful awareness of our “own inner life and the surrounding world with
kindness, a form of positive regard for the self and others.”51 Siegel notes that “[t]his
form of awareness [i.e., mindful awareness] . . . can be thought of as having the features
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of self-compassion and other-directed compassion.”52 According to Siegel, mindful
awareness, which he preferably calls “mindfulness,” is the basis for integration. As
mentioned above, integration of consciousness is the foundation for the other domains of
integration. And this domain of integration involves, at its core, mindful awareness or
mindfulness.53
Mindfulness is the state of being attentive to our inner experiences, without being
swept up by judgments.54 And there are two types of mindfulness, one a state of being
and the other a trait. Mindfulness as a state of being is the awareness of what is going on
at the present moment.55 It is being attentive to “our here-and-now experience with
curiosity, openness, acceptance, and love (COAL).”56 COAL is essential here because,
Sigel remarks, “If you have a COAL stance, the rest takes care of itself. There is no
particular goal, no effort to ‘get rid’ of something, just the intention to be, and
specifically, to experience being in the moment as one lets go of grasping onto judgments
and goals.”57 Mindfulness as a state of being generates short-term integration.
Mindfulness as a trait, on the other hand, creates log-term integration. This type of
mindfulness is the state of being mindful of our moment by moment experiences.58
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The point being made here is that mindfulness is the foundation for integration.
And mindfulness, according to Siegel, as quoted above, has the features of self-empathy
and other-directed empathy. Thus, one can conclude that integration has the features of
self-empathy and empathy. In other words, self-empathy and empathy toward other
constitute integration. Empathy is therefore essential not only for the healing of shame,
but also for the promotion of health and well-being in general. As articulated above,
empathy is a skill that can be learned and cultivated at any time in the lifespan, and I
believe that NVC can help with its cultivation.
Empathy and NVC
Rosenberg developed the model and practice of NVC out of his firsthand
experience with violence, especially during his childhood in Detroit in the 1940s. He
henceforth became preoccupied with the following two questions: “What happens to
disconnect us from our compassionate nature, leading us to behave violently and
exploitatively? And conversely, what allows some people to stay connected to their
compassionate nature under even the most trying circumstances?”59
To answer these questions, Rosenberg supposes that there are four ways we
receive a negative message someone gives us.60 One is to receive the message
“personally by hearing blame and criticism.”61 For example, if I bump into someone’s
new car, and the owner is angry and says, “You, idiot!,” if I choose to take the message
personally, I would accept the person’s judgment of me as an idiot and blame myself for
59
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bumping into his or her car. My self-talk would be: “I am an idiot!” A second way to
receive a negative message is to blame the speaker by expressing contempt or even rage
toward him or her. In response to “You, idiot!,” I would react with rage and say, “You
think I’m an idiot? You are the idiot!” A third option is to acknowledge our own feelings
and needs. It is to practice self-empathy. Using the same example above, I would express
myself as follows: “When I hear you say I am an idiot, I feel sad and angry, because I
need some understanding.” The fourth option is to sense the feelings and needs of the
speaker. It is to practice empathy. I might ask the owner of the car I hit as follows: “Are
you feeling angry because you need some considerations for your new car?” The first two
options, according to Rosenberg, generate more violence, whereas the last two engender
life-enhancing communication. Hence, NVC aims to equip people with the skills of selfempathy and empathy.
According to Rosenberg, there are four basic skills a person needs to learn and to
integrate in order to be able to practice empathy toward the self and toward others. The
four basic skills are observation (O), feeling (F), need (N), and request (R).
Understanding these four basic skills is the first step to the integration and practice of
NVC.
Observation is a non-judgmental and non-evaluative description of what is going
on. For instance, a class starts at 8 a.m., but a student comes at 8:15 a.m. And this is the
third time this particular student comes to the class at 8:15 a.m. The teacher then says to
the student: “You are always late!” This is a judgment. This is an evaluation of the
student. An observation would be: “This is the third time you come to this class at
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8:15am.” From an NVC perspective, judgments and evaluations escalate violence,
whereas observation can lead to Nonviolent Communication.
Emotions play important roles in human life. Emotions might get triggered any
time by any reaction, thought, behavior, event, or circumstance. When we are not
conscious of our feelings, we might be controlled by them and react automatically and
unconsciously in regrettable ways. But when we consciously name and acknowledge our
feelings, we can be in control of them and can react deliberately and out of choice.
Naming and acknowledging our feelings as they arise in us is therefore an important
component of the NVC basic skills. NVC distinguishes between feelings and nonfeelings. A feeling would state, “I feel sad, anxious, or happy, etc.”62 A non-feeling
would state, “I feel like a failure.” This sentence expresses a thought, not a feeling. It
expresses what I think I am.
From an NVC perspective, needs, whether they are physical, emotional, or
spiritual, are at the root of our feelings. In fact, needs are the underlying motivation for
all our reactions, whether we are conscious of them or not. When our needs are met, we
thrive and are energized to produce life-giving reactions. When our needs are not
satisfied, we feel pain. But we are motivated to meet our needs. Thus, when we do not
know how to meet those needs in life-giving, interdependent ways, we are prone to be
violent toward ourselves and toward others.
Human needs are therefore fundamental values that serve our well-being in this
life. Hence, the ability to recognize and to acknowledge our needs is very important. In
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fact, identifying needs is the conceptual hub of the whole process of NVC.63 The teacher
in the example above might need respect.64 Needs should be differentiated from
strategies. Strategies are ways to meet needs. The teacher in our example might say to the
student after judging the student as being always late, “I need you to come to class on
time!” This is not an NVC strategy, because it is a demand and not a request.
Request, the fourth component of NVC basic skills, is a strategy to meet the
identified need(s) that underlie(s) our feeling(s). As such, a request needs to be specific.
In fact, NVC uses the acronym PLATO to describe the characteristics of a request.
PLATO stands for Person, Location, Action, Time, and Object.65 Moreover, a request lets
the person to whom the request is made freely choose either to accept or not. That is, a
request is not a demand. A demand requires the other person to accept what is asked. A
demand is coercive, a request is not.
Observation is the non-judgmental description of what is going on; feeling is
naming the feelings that get triggered by what is observed; need is naming the needs
behind the identified feelings; and request is the expression of the strategy one envisages
to meet the needs. The teacher could express him- or herself to the student, using the four
basic skills of NVC, as follows: “This class starts at 8 a.m. This is the third time you have
come at 8:15 a.m. I feel angry and worried, for I need respect and commitment to this
class. Would you please come to my office this afternoon at three, or tomorrow morning
at ten, or anytime you are available and talk about this?”
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In addition to the basic skills of OFNR, NVC involves also three skill sets, which
are self-empathy, honesty, and empathy.66 Self-empathy is the process of identifying,
based on what one observes, what one feels and needs, and making request accordingly.
Self-compassion may then lead to honesty, the process of expressing one’s observation,
feelings, and needs, and, if needed, requests to others. Empathy is the process of
identifying the feelings and needs of the other, and, if needed, finding strategies that
might make the needs met. Empathy might start with what is called “empathic guess.”
The question I asked the owner of the car I hit (“Are you feeling angry because you need
some considerations for your new car?”) is an empathic guess. The person might have
feelings and needs otherwise. Self-empathy, empathy, and honesty are the goals of NVC,
as Hunsinger and Latini notes, “NVC aims for three things: authentic connection with
oneself, [or self-empathy,] empathic reception of the other, and honest expression toward
the other.”67
Conclusion
What is needed for the healing of shame, from a social scientific perspective, is
empathy—empathy toward the self and empathy from other. Moreover, empathy toward
the self and empathy toward other are essential for the formation of integration, the heart
of well-being. Therefore, empathy serves the well-being of the self and the neighbor.
Self-empathy, empathy from other, and empathy toward other serve the well-being of the
self. Empathy toward other serves the well-being of the neighbor. It should be noted,
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however, that being empathic is not salvific. It does not guarantee one’s salvation.
Salvation is a divine gift, not something we gain by being empathic. Serving the wellbeing of the self and that of the neighbor through empathy belongs to the earthly realm or
the human existence coram mundo. It belongs to the realm of the law and reason.
Empathy is a skill that can be learned and developed through NVC, a process of
communication that educates people to be able to give empathy both toward the self and
toward other, as well as to receive empathy from other. NVC is therefore important for
the healing of shame and for the formation of integration. Accordingly, in order for the
Malagasy church to effectively address the problem and pain of shame in the Malagasy
context, I encourage the church to embrace the practice of NVC and equip people with
this life-giving skill.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON HEALING SHAME THEOLOGICALLY
Chapter six, in proposing a strategy for the healing of shame from a social
scientific perspective, has argued that empathy, a skill that can be learned and developed
through NVC practice, is the linchpin for shame resilience. Indeed, empathy is essential
for the cultivation of integration, the heart of well-being. The present chapter shall
propose a strategy for the healing of shame from a theological perspective, and argue that
what is needed for the healing of shame is faith in God’s act of justification. But faith is
the fruit of the Word. Hence, the present chapter is divided into two sections. Section one
provides an interpretation of justification. The purpose of the interpretation is to highlight
the importance of this divine act for the human phenomenon of shame. Section two is a
short observation on faith and preaching.
Shame and Justification
As noted in chapter one, Smedes claims in his book Shame and Grace: Healing
the Shame We Don’t Deserve that grace is the antidote for shame. According to Smedes,
grace is acceptance whereas “[t]he feeling of shame is about our very selves—not about
some bad thing we did or said but about what we are. It tells us that we are unworthy.
Totally. It is not as if a few seams in the garment of our selves need stitching; the whole
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fabric is frayed. We feel that we are unacceptable.”1 According to Smedes, grace meets
the feeling of unworthiness of shame.
Albers, in his book Shame: A Faith Perspective, also claims that grace, as
acceptance, meets the feeling of unacceptableness of shame and heals it. In addition,
Albers believes that the creation, baptism, the theology of the cross, church community,
and justification are all helpful theological resources for addressing the problem and pain
of shame.2 Shame is the feeling that one is bad. The biblical creation account, however,
confronts such an assertion and gives comfort that one is actually good as a creation of
God. Moreover, Shame shakes a person’s identity. It is a disease that destroys the self as
a whole. Baptism gives reassurance of a person’s identity. In baptism, a person becomes
a child of God and that is who she or he is, as God says “You are my [child]; today I have
begotten you” (Psalm 2:7).
In the cross, Jesus bears all our shame, which means that we do not bear our
shame alone. God is with us in our shame experience. The faith community is also a
place where individuals bear the burdens of one another’s shame. Finally, Albers asserts
that the doctrine of justification, when it becomes a lived reality, overcomes
unworthiness. For him, “the doctrine of justification is that God has declared to you that
you are a person of value and worth.”3
I agree with Smedes and Albers that grace, as God’s acceptance of us, despite our
unacceptable sinful nature, heals shame, for what a person with shame needs is
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acceptance. However, I veer from Albers in that I associate grace with justification.
According to one of the Reformation dicta, justification is by grace. In fact, I agree with
Paul Tillich in his interpretation of justification as God’s acceptance of the unacceptable.4
Moreover, I relate baptism also to justification. As mentioned in chapter one, passive
righteousness or justification is bestowed upon us through baptism.
Furthermore, the cross, i.e., the death and resurrection of Christ, for me, is
inseparable from justification. Christ died for our sins and rose from the dead for our
justification (Romans 4:25). Moreover, “the message of the cross,” Mattes asserts,
“liberates nature and allows creation to be restored.”5 That is, creation is subject to
justification. This also means that a community of faith is a community that lives under
the reality of justification. In other words, justification, to borrow Bayer’s words, “has
principal significance. It touches on every theme. Justification concerns not merely one’s
own history, not only world history, but also natural history. It has to do with
everything.”6
As a result, justification has to do with shame. First, God justifies the sinful
human being. That is, justification is for sin. I argued in chapter four, however, that sin is
interconnected primarily with shame. According to the Genesis account of the Fall, Adam
and Eve felt shame after they had sinned. Also, while sin is both behavioral (guilt) and
ontological (shame), the ontological aspect has priority over the behavioral. We sin
because we are sinners. Furthermore, the Lutheran understanding of the second or
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theological use of the Law shows that sin generates shame. Therefore, if justification is
for sin, then it is for shame.
Second, as noted above, justification is interconnected with the death and
resurrection of Christ. Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger, drawing on Barth, argues that
Jesus, on the cross, bears the shamefulness of our sin in order for us to share God’s honor
and glory. She writes,
According to Barth, God enters fully into the shamefulness of sin and in Christ
takes it upon himself so that human beings might share God’s honor and glory.
Barth goes so far as to call Jesus “the one great sinner” (IV/1, 239). Not because
of any sinfulness of his own, but because of the sin and shame of the entire human
race that he bears in his body. Jesus knows human sin in its awful depths and
bears the shamefulness of it to an extent greater than human imagining.7
Third, justification is both forensic and effective. It is forgiveness of sins and new
creation or new life. That is, it is for our deeds and for our being, meaning that it is both
for our guilt and our shame. To quote Luther again, he describes God’s act of justification
as follows: “[God] first purifies by imputation, then he gives the Holy Spirit, through
whom he purifies even in substance. Faith cleanses through remissions of sins, the Holy
Spirit cleanses through the effect. This is divine cleansing and purification which is let
down from heaven, by faith and the Holy Spirit.”8 For Luther, the forensic is effective,
and vice versa, as Bayer writes,
For Luther the customary alternative of “forensic” or “effective” is no alternative
at all. The forensic is effective, the effective forensic. That is his answer to the
much-debated question. What God says, God does. The reverse is also true. What
God does, God says; his doing is not ambiguous. God’s work is God’s speech.
God’s speech is not fleeting breath. It is a most effective breath that creates life,
that summons into life. It is the “nature” of God to create out of nothing, to be the
7
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Creator by the Word alone. This is not a speculative thought, for those who
confess the one who creates out of nothing and gives life to the dead are those
who have experienced the truth that God justifies the ungodly by his word,
creating a new self for the old Adamic self.9
Thus, our new self, i.e., our new identity, is safe and secured in God through the
divine act of justification. That is, justification is the ultimate ground for our identity.
Justification is God’s unconditional acceptance of us. It is God’s “yes” to us, despite our
unacceptableness. This is important for the phenomenon of shame. First, in our
experience of shame, either disgrace or internalized, we can recur to the reality of
justification again and again. Second, justification creates a sense of shame, i.e.,
discretion shame, in us. It reminds us that we are children of God and must live as such.
We are good trees that bear good fruits.
To recur to justification again and again requires faith, which is a total trust in
God and his promise of justification in Jesus Christ. In faith, justification becomes ours.
It becomes a lived reality in our life. But how do we come to faith?
Faith and Preaching
We come to faith by hearing the Word of God (Romans 10:17). The hearing of
the Word requires preaching (Romans 10:14). Therefore, preaching plays a crucial role
for the formation of faith. Preaching, from a Lutheran perspective, is both judgment and
promise. It is both Law and Gospel. The Law judges our being as well as our deeds,
whereas the Gospel transforms also our being as well as our deeds. The Gospel is nothing
but the divine gift of justification. According to Bayer, justification is a speech act. It is a
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word of promise.10 As mentioned above, justification is both forensic and effective.
Therefore, to preach the gospel rightly is to proclaim it as addressing our shame (being)
and guilt (deeds). Likewise, to hear the gospel rightly is to hear it as for our shame and
our guilt.
It is important to note that the task of proclaiming the gospel is not confined
particularly to the art of preaching. Theology, in general, as Forde states, is for
proclamation. It is for the proclamation of God’s promise which brings about forgiveness
of sins and new life.11 Forde argues that theology and proclamation are closely correlated.
Without theology there is no proclamation, and without proper understanding of
proclamation, theology falsifies itself and oversteps its bounds.12 In addition to
proclaiming the gospel as addressing shame and guilt, the church in Madagascar, in order
to address the problem and pain of shame, needs to produce theology that proclaims the
gospel rightly.
CONCLUSION
From the perspective of the two kinds of righteousness, what is needed for the
healing of shame is faith and empathy. In faith we live in the reality of justification, a
divine act that secures our core identity in and before God. In other words, faith heals our
shame coram Deo. It heals shame at the theological level. In empathy, we heal our own
shame and that of the other. Self-empathy and empathy from other heals our own shame,
whereas empathy toward other contributes to the healing of the shame of the other. Stated
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differently, empathy heals our shame coram mundo. It heals shame at the personal and
interpersonal (social) levels. This is important because the healing of shame, according to
Pattison, constitutes “two main tasks. The first is to overcome or transcend the sense of . .
. shame in individuals. The second is to address the social and political factors that create
and exploit an unhelpful sense of shame and alienation on the level of institutions and
communities.”13 This approach is what Pattison calls “integration,” which he describes as
follows:
The use of the word “integration” is proposed as a way of indicating that the task
of [healing] shame extends beyond particular individuals. . . . [W]hat might be
required for optimal well-being is a situation where individuals and groups are
recognized and respected by themselves and others as distinct, but also as
belonging within the community.14
But a more integrative approach to the healing of shame involves healing of
shame coram Deo. Thus, the healing of shame has three main tasks. The first is to heal
shame at the personal level. The second is to heal shame at the social level. And the third
is to heal shame at the theological level. All three levels are intertwined with each other.
Faith and empathy are what is necessary for the healing of shame at these three levels.
Faith comes through preaching, a proclamation of the good news of justification,
whereas empathy can be learned and developed through the practice of NVC.
Nevertheless, faith and empathy go hand-in-hand. They are inseparable. Yet they must be
distinguished from each other, with faith having primacy over empathy. Faith is the basis
for empathy, and not vice versa. But as faith is active in love, so is it active in empathy.
Indeed, Rosenberg connects the practice of NVC with love, as he writes,
13
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Nonviolent Communication really grew from my attempt to understand the
concept of love and how to manifest it, how to do it. I had come to the conclusion
that love is not just something we feel, but it is something we manifest, something
we do, something we have. And love is something we give: We give ourselves in
particular ways. It is a gift when you reveal yourself nakedly and honestly, at any
given moment, for no other purpose than to reveal what’s alive in you. Not to
blame, criticize, or punish. Just “Here I am, and here is what I would like. This is
vulnerability at this moment.” To me, that giving is a manifestation of love.15
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APPENDIX A
Sample of Informed Consent Form
You are invited to be in a research study which explores how shame functions among
“shepherds” working in the Malagasy Lutheran Church’s three main tobys—
Ankaramalaza, Soatanàna, and Farihimena. I ask that you read this form and ask any
questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.
This study is being conducted by me, Barson Lahivelo Mahafaly, 1570 Eustis St., Apt.
#220, St. Paul, MN 55108, USA, as part of my PhD dissertation project in Pastoral Care
and Counseling at Luther Seminary, St. Paul, MN, USA.
My advisor is Theresa Latini.
Background Information:
The purpose of this study is to explore how shame functions among shepherds who work
in the Malagasy Lutheran Church tobys.
Procedures:
If you agree to be in this study, I would ask you to do the following things: I will interview you
individually for about two hours to gain your own description of how shame functions in you.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
The study might trigger your own shame. If so, you are free to end the interview at any
point without any negative repercussions.
In addition, there will be no direct benefits of participation in this project. There will be
indirect benefits, though. My knowledge of the dynamics of shame within the Malagasy
context in general and in the tobys in particular will help me as a teacher of theology to
better train my future students for their pastoral care and counseling ministry. Moreover,
it will help me to have clear ideas of how to conduct workshops for toby ministers to
provide more effective care to those who come or live in the tobys.
Confidentiality:
The records of this study will be kept confidential. If I publish any type of report, I will
not include any information that will make it possible to identify you. All data will be
kept in a locked file in my study room; only my advisor, Theresa Latini, and I will have
access to the data and, if applicable, any tape or video recording. If the research is
terminated for any reason, all data and recordings will be destroyed. While I will make
every effort to ensure confidentiality, anonymity cannot be guaranteed due to the small
number to be studied.
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Raw data will be retained but all identifying information removed by May 30, 2017.
Voluntary Nature of the Study:
Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations
with Luther Seminary or with the Malagasy Lutheran Church. If you decide to
participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without affecting those relationships.
Contacts and Questions:
The researcher conducting this study is Barson Lahivelo Mahafaly. You may ask any
questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact me at the toby
superintendent’s number.
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.
Statement of Consent:
I have read the above information or have had it read to me. I have received answers to
questions asked. I consent to participate in the study.

Signature

Date

Signature of investigator

Date

I consent to be audiorecorded (or videorecorded):
Signature

Date

I consent to allow use of my direct quotations in the published thesis document.
Signature

Date

APPENDIX B
Interview Protocol
1. Please tell me about yourself: your name, date of birth, how long you have been
working as a shepherd in this toby.
2. When you hear the word “shame,” what comes to your mind?
a. What words would you use to describe shame?
b. Could you give an example of when you felt shame and describe what
was going on in you then?
3. How does this feeling of shame impact your ministry?
a. What does shame do to you as a person and as a shepherd?
b. Could you give an example of when shame interfered with your ministry?
c. What gives you the strength and courage to keep on doing your ministry
despite shame?
4. What do you think happens when one acknowledges his or her shame?
a. What might be the importance of being aware of one’s shame?
b. Could you give an example of when you were aware of this feeling of
shame and what happened?
5. Anything else you would like to share?
Thank you for your time for and participation in this interview!
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APPENDIX C
Feelings Inventory1
This list is neither exhaustive nor definitive. It is compiled for the purpose of
helping people to be able to clearly articulate feelings and confidently describe a whole
range of emotional states.

1
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How we are likely to feel when our needs are being met
absorbed
adventurous
affectionate
alert
alive
amazed
amused
animated
appreciative
ardent
aroused
astonished
blissful
breathless
buoyant
calm
carefree
cheerful
comfortable
complacent
composed
concerned
confident
contented
cool
curious
dazzled
delighted
eager
ebullient
ecstatic
effervescent
elated
enchanted
encouraged
energetic

engrossed
enlivened
enthusiastic
excited
exhilarated
expansive
expectant
exultant
fascinated
free
friendly
fulfilled
glad
gleeful
glorious
glowing
good-humored
grateful
gratified
happy
helpful
hopeful
inquisitive
inspired
intense
interested
intrigued
invigorated
involved
joyous, joyful
jubilant
keyed-up
loving
mellow
merry
mirthful

moved
optimistic
overjoyed
overwhelmed
peaceful
perky
pleasant
pleased
proud
quiet
radiant
rapturous
refreshed
relaxed
relieved
satisfied
secure
sensitive
serene
spellbound
splendid
stimulated
surprised
tender
thankful
thrilled
touched
tranquil
trusting
upbeat
warm
wide-awake
wonderful
zestful
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How we are likely to feel when our needs are not being met
afraid
aggravated
agitated
alarmed
aloof
angry
anguished
annoyed
anxious
apathetic
apprehensive
aroused
ashamed
beat
bewildered
bitter
blah
blue
bored
brokenhearted
chagrined
cold
concerned
confused
cool
cross
dejected
depressed
despairing
despondent
detached
disaffected
disappointed
discouraged
disgusted
disheartened
dismayed
displeased
disquieted
distressed
disturbed
downcast
downhearted
dull

edgy
embarrassed
embittered
exasperated
exhausted
fatigued
fearful
fidgety
forlorn
frightened
frustrated
furious
gloomy
guilty
harried
heavy
helpless
hesitant
horrible
horrified
hostile
hot
humdrum
hurt
impatient
indifferent
intense
irate
irked
irritated
jealous
jittery
keyed-up
lazy
leery
lethargic
listless
lonely
mad
mean
miserable
mopey
morose
mournful

nervous
nettled
numb
overwhelmed
panicky
passive
perplexed
pessimistic
puzzled
rancorous
reluctant
repelled
resentful
restless
sad
scared
sensitive
shaky
shocked
skeptical
sleepy
sorrowful
sorry
spiritless
startled
surprised
suspicious
tepid
terrified
tired
troubled
uncomfortable
unconcerned
uneasy
unglued
unhappy
unnerved
unsteady
upset
uptight
vexed
weary
wistful
withdrawn
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woeful
worried
wretched

APPENDIX D
Needs Inventory1
Again, this list is neither exhaustive nor definitive. It is compiled for the purpose
of helping people to be able to identify their needs and to clearly articulate them.

1
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Some of the basic human needs we all share
Autonomy
 to choose one’s dreams, goals,
values
 to choose one’s plan for fulfilling
one’s dreams, goals, values
Celebration
 to celebrate the creation of life
and dreams fulfilled
 to celebrate losses: loved ones,
dreams, etc. (mourning)
Integrity
 authenticity
 creativity
 meaning
 self-worth
Interdependence
 acceptance
 appreciation
 closeness
 community
 consideration
 contribution to the enrichment of
life (to exercise one’s power by
giving that which contributes to
life)
 emotional safety
 empathy
 honesty (the empowering
honesty that enables us to learn
from our limitation)
 love
 reassurance
 respect
 support
 trust
 understanding
 warmth
Play


fun



laughter

Spiritual Communion
 beauty
 harmony
 inspiration
 order
 peace
Physical Nurturance
 air
 food
 movement, exercise
 protection from life-threatening
forms of life: viruses, bacteria,
insects, predatory animals
 rest
 sexual expression
 shelter
 touch
 water
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